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ABSTRACT
Digital forensics is the science involved in the discovery, preservation, and analysis of
evidence on digital devices. The end goal of digital forensics is to determine the events that
occurred, who performed them, and how were they performed. In order for an investigation
to lead to a sound conclusion, it must demonstrate that it is the product of sound scientific
methodology.
Digital forensics is inundated with many problems. These problems include an insufficient
number of capable examiners, without a standard for certification there is a lack of training
for examiners and current tools are unable to deal with the more complex cases, and lack
of intelligent automation. This work perpetuates the ability of computer science principles
to digital forensics creates a basis of acceptance for digital forensics in both the legal and
forensic science community.
This work focuses on three solutions. In terms of education, there is a lack of mandatory
standardization, certification, and accreditation. Currently, there is a lack of standards in
the interpretation of forensic evidence. The current techniques used by forensic investigators
during analysis generally involve ad-hoc methods based on the vague and untested under-
standing of the system. These forensic techniques are the root of the significant differences in
the testimony conducted by digital forensic expert witnesses. Lastly, digital forensic expert
witness testimony is under great scrutiny because of the lack of standards in both education
and investigative methods.
To remedy this situation, we developed multiple avenues to facilitate more effective in-
vestigations. To improve the availability and standardization of education, we developed
a multidisciplinary digital forensics curriculum. To improve the standards of forensic evi-
dence interpretation, we developed a methodology based on graph theory to develop a logical
view of low-level forensic data. To improve the admissibility of evidence, we developed a
methodology to assign a likelihood to the hypotheses determined by forensic investigators.
Together, these methods significantly improve the effectiveness of digital forensic investiga-
tions. Overall, this work calls the computer science community to join forces with the digital
forensics community in order to develop, test and implement established computer science
methodology in the application of digital forensics.
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Be Brave
Be Strong
Be Proud
And With That You Will Have The Mental Fortitude
To Face The Greatest Adversity
Life Has To Offer
∼ Stephen Anthony Palmer
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION
Thesis Statement: The application of computer science principles to digital forensics
creates a basis of acceptance for digital forenscs in legal and foresnic science community.
Forensic science is the term used to refer to a broad range of disciplines that use scientific
techniques to analyze physical, chemical, biological, and digital data. It is more commonly
known as the application of science to the enforcement of laws within both the criminal
and civil justice system. There are many forensic science disciplines including anthropology,
criminalistics, engineering sciences, odontology, pathology, psychiatry & behavioral science,
questions documents, toxicology, and digital & multimedia sciences.
The role of a forensic scientist is ever-evolving. They are responsible for analyzing the
evidence and presenting the results of the analysis in a court of law. The forensic scientist is
beholden to the existence of legal standards for the admissibility of forensic tests and expert
testimony. The admissibility of a forensic test is Frye v United States, which states that
the forensic technique in question must have general acceptance by the scientific community.
Rule 702 of the Federal Rules of Evidence regulates the admissibility of expert testimony in
regard to a test or discipline. Daubert v Merrell Dow Pharmaceutical, Inc states that the
decision about the admissibility of scientific evidence resides with the judge hearing the case.
Forensic science produces valuable evidence and contributes to the successful prosecution,
conviction, and exoneration. Advances in serology have demonstrated that certain areas of
forensic science have potential to aid law enforcement. However, substantive information
and testimony based on faulty practices demonstrates the potential danger of evidence and
testimony derived from imperfect testing and analysis. There are certain challenges facing
the forensic science community. The shortage in the availability of skilled and well-trained
personnel. This stems from a lack of standard education and accreditation process. This
dearth in standardized knowledge, leads to the inability to generalize about current practices
within the forensic community. This creates significant variations in the interpretation of
forensic evidence. Lastly, the need to measure performance and limits in the accuracy
of forensic analysis. As a result, the depth, reliability, and overall quality of substantive
information arising from the forensic examination of evidence available to the legal system
vary substantially across the country [1].
This work aims to solve the challenges in the forensic science subdiscipline digital forensics.
In order to increase the number of skilled professionals, the development of a self-contain
undergraduate digital forensic curriculum package. Next, in order to generalize current
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practices and limit variations in the interpretation of forensic evidence, we present a survey
of current digital forensic analysis techniques as well as build an extensible framework.
Finally, we implement our framework with multiple case studies and discuss our results. This
framework provides a likelihood of events from the provided evidence in order to demonstrate
the reliability and quality of the methods.
The rest of this thesis is organized as follows: first, we introduce digital forensics and
present a background in forensic science and digital forensics in Chapter 2. Chapter 3 shows
the related work of the projects presented in this paper. In Chapter 5 on the Digital Forensic
Education Initiative. Chapter 4 present a survey of current analysis techniques in digital
forensic analysis. Chapter 6 describes the conceptual design of our analysis methodology.
Chapter 8 evaluates the implementation of Sherlock with cause studies and discuss the effec-
tiveness of Sherlock. We further support this thesis with a discussion defined in Chapter 7
and conclude with future work in Chapter 9.
2
CHAPTER 2: BACKGROUND
Forensic science is the application of science to criminal and civil investigations. The role
of the forensic scientist is to collect, to preserve, and to analyze scientific evidence. The
field of forensic science is a combination of many disciplines: anthropology, criminalistics,
engineering sciences, odontology, and pathology.
2.1 THE DIGITAL FORENSIC PROCESS
The U.S National Institute of Justice (NIJ) in the Electronic Crime Scene Investigation
Guide [2] published as workflow meant to guide to digital forensic examiners [3]. Their
workflow consists of the following steps:
• Preparation: Prepare the equipment and tools to perform the tasks required during
an investigation.
• Collection: Search, for document, and collect or make copies of the physical objects
that contain electronic evidence.
• Examination: Make the electronic evidence visible and document contents of the sys-
tem. Data reduction is performed to identify the evidence.
• Analysis: Analyze the evidence from the Examination phase to determine the signifi-
cance and probative value.
• Reporting: Create examination notes after each case.
Digital forensics is able to solve crimes committed with computers (e.g. phishing and
bank fraud), solve crimes against people where the evidence may reside digitally (e.g. money
laundering and child exploitation) and reconstruct the evidence left by cyber attacks. In
the beginning of digital forensics, many of the techniques were developed primarily for data
recovery. There was not a great need for digital forensics because the evidence on systems
could easily be recovered and with limited space on disks, most perpetrators relied on phys-
ical media such as printouts. In the late 1990s and early 2000s, digital forensics began to
blossom. The widespread use of Microsoft Windows limited the scope of knowledge required
of examiners. As well as the failure to implement encryption technology for data made it
easy to develop and sell forensic tools. This was the start of digital forensics research and
professionalization. In the last decade, progress in the field of digital forensics slowed and
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the field was struck by many challenges. Today, examiners find it difficult to obtain data in
a forensically sound manner and to process the data to provide results. The challenges only
grow as the ubiquity of devices [4].
The increased public awareness of digital evidence says nothing about the state of digital
forensics as a science. Indeed, the awareness of the need to collect and analyze digital evi-
dence does not necessarily translate to scientific theory, scientific process and scientifically
derived knowledge. The traditional forensic sciences (e.g., serology, toxicology, and ballistics)
emerged out of academic research, enabling science to precede forensic science applications,
as it should. Digital forensics, however, emerged out of the practitioner community - com-
puter crime investigators and digital forensic tool developers seeking solutions to real-world
problems. While these efforts have produced a great amount of factual knowledge and sev-
eral commonly accepted processes and hardware and software tools, many experts concede
that the scientific method did not underlie much of early digital forensic research [5].
2.2 THE HISTORY OF DIGITAL FORENSICS
The practice of digital forensics is relatively new. Digital forensics’ history starts in the
1970s with the first noted description of using digital information to investigate a crime
in Donn Parker’s book, Crime by Computer [6]. As new devices develop and become more
common, the practice of digital forensics continually expands. In the 1980s, there is a growth
in computer crime leading law enforcement agencies to begin establishing specialized groups,
i.e. FBI’s Computer Analysis and Response Team [7]. Cliff Stoll writes of his pursuit of
a hacker named Markus Hess, The Cuckoos´ Egg [8], one of the first forensic examinations.
In the 1990s, computer forensics begins to join both the academic and forensic science
world with the book, A Forensic Methodology for Countering Computer Crime [9]. As the
commercialization of computers increased the number of people using computers more and
more computer professionals who worked with law enforcement on a case-by-case basis. The
1990s marked the start of the Golden Age of digital forensics. Digital forensics became
a magic window that could see into the past as well as into the criminal mind, with the
dominance of the Windows platform it was easy to build forensic tools. Today digital
forensics is facing a crisis as the capabilities of previous generations of digital forensic tools
are diminished over the recent advances in digital devices [4].
Digital forensics faces many challenges:
• Growing size of storage devices is frequently insufficient time to create a forensic image
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Figure 2.1: A graphical portrayal of the history of digital forensics.
• Increasing prevalence of embedded flash storage & the proliferation of hardware inter-
faces means storage devices can no longer be readily removed or imaged
• Proliferation of operating systems and file formats is dramatically increasing the re-
quirements and complexity of data exploitation tools and the cost of tool development
• Cases require the analysis of multiple devices followed by the correlation of the found
evidence
• Pervasive encryptions means that data frequently cannot be processed
• Use of the cloud for remote processing and storage, and to split a single data structure
into elements, means that frequently data or code cannot be found
• Malware not written to persistent storage necessitates the need for expensive RAM
forensics
• Legal challenges increasingly limit the scope of forensic investigations
2.3 DIGITAL FORENSICS AND SCIENTIFIC RIGOR
Digital forensics is an established field of forensic science, however, there is no formal
theory on how to conduct an investigation. A digital forensic investigation is based on
the abilities of its practitioner. Many believe that digital forensics does not require theory.
Yet, many physical investigations rely on scientific rigor [10]. For example, DNA analysis
is instrumental in forensic investigations. DNA evidence identifies matching DNA of an
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individual or potential perpetrator with little probability of error. Currently, digital forensics
has matured without the identification of scientific standards [11].
Many forensic science disciplines have theories that are published, accepted, and tested.
However, digital forensics is directed by the technology investigated and the available tools [10].
The legal system fails to understand the significance of the digital evidence. Digital forensics
remains far behind other forensic disciplines [11]. The legal system relies on the scientific
method in order to ensure the admissibility of digital evidence in a court of law [12]. The
Daubert standard determines the necessary factors for the admissibility of evidence in legal
proceedings:
• Judge is the gatekeeper: The task of assuring the scientific expert testimony truly
proceeds from scientific knowledge rests on the trial judge
• Relevance and reliability: The trial judge ensures that the expert’s testimony is relevant
to the task at hand and rests on a reliable foundation
• Scientific methodology: The proponent can demonstrate that it is the product of sound
scientific methodology
• Illustrative factors: The process of formulating hypotheses and conducting experiments
to prove or falsify the hypothesis is provided by a set of illustrative factors are met
This standard provides a clear and concise judgment on the digital evidence in court
cases. In order to allow for the admissibility of digital evidence, we must be able to make
well-reason and concrete claims about the accuracy and validity of conclusions presented in
court [11].
Computer crime involves either a computer and/or a network [13]. Computer crimes
encompass a range of activities. When an individual is the target of a computer crime, the
computer is considered as a tool, these crimes include fraud and identity theft, information
warfare, phishing scams, spam and the propagation of illegal obscene or offensive content.
Computer crimes where the goal the computer is the target, the crimes include computer
viruses, denial-of-service attacks, and malware. Cyberwarfare is the battlespace use and
targeting of computers and networks in warfare and involves both offensive and defensive
operations pertaining to a threat of cyber attacks, espionage, and sabotage. Computer
crimes produce digital evidence that can be used to reconstruct events.
Digital evidence is ubiquitous and constantly evolving making it difficult to determine
its admissibility. Digital forensics is in need of a deterministic approach to obtain the most
judicious conclusions from evidence. To our knowledge, tools that aid in the scientific method
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of reasoning about digital evidence are nonexistent. Current digital forensic tools mainly
focus on evidence recovery. These tools have limited abilities to further analyze the data that
is recovered [14]. There are multiple investigative frameworks, however, none have risen as
a standard for the analysis phase. This framework will enable researchers and examiners to
apply various reasoning models to their cases. The application of these reasoning methods
would be automated in order to avoid discrepancies and provide reproducibility. As digital
forensic science advances it is important to be able to rigorously determine conclusions are
drawn from the electronic evidence. The ability to determine if these conclusions are drawn
in the most judicious manner will also be of critical importance.
2.4 DIGITAL FORENSICS CHALLENGES
Digital forensics is undergoing a great change. This change is stimulated mainly by tech-
nological advancement has generated a reliance on digital forensics in legal system [15]. A
digital forensic investigation occurs when digital evidence is collected and examined in ac-
cordance with the law [10]. Currently, the digital forensic investigative process has four main
stages: collection, preservation, analysis, and visualization. Each of these phases must be
performed in a judicious manner in order to allow the evidence found from the investigative
process to be admissible in court [16]. However, the efficacy of the investigative phases and
the extent to which the resultant evidence should be admissible is not clearly defined [11].
Presently, the analysis phase of the digital forensic investigative process is marred by
bias and inaccuracy. The analysis phase lacks proper scientific analysis, which has severely
impacted the reliability of investigative findings and the credibility of forensic analysts [17].
In order to overcome these obstacles, we must rely on the scientific method. Evidence
reasoning is a fundamental part of investigative efficacy; however, the digital forensic process
is currently deficient in the scientific rigor necessary to function in this capacity.
The examination of digital evidence requires a vast array knowledge. This knowledge
encompasses various types of computers, models, programs, and etc. Analysts have varying
educational backgrounds allowing for incompatible assumptions and differing conclusions
from the examination of the same evidence. These problems have arisen in numerous court
cases across the United States [11].
Starting in the 2000s, digital evidence has increasingly been used in court proceedings.
In the case of the State of Connecticut v. Amero, a elementary school substitute teacher
was convicted of contributing to the delinquency of minors because a school computer in
her class displayed pop-ups from a pornographic website. It was found that the school
computer was infected with spyware which contributed to the presentation of the pop-ups.
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Julie Amero was able to get the conviction overturned but not before her previous life was
in shambles [18].
In 2007, Michael Fiola returned his laptop to his employer. The laptop was passed to
his boss after someone noticed Fiola used an exorbitant amount of data in comparison with
his co-workers. After an investigation, child pornography was found in a folder that stores
images viewed online Fiola was fired and charged with the possession of child pornography.
The charges were eventually dropped after Fiola and his family spent thousands of dollars
fighting the case. Fiola‘s defense attorney was able to find that the laptop contained a virus
that was programmed to visit multiple children pornography websites [19].
More recently, Miller in the United States v. Miller [20], it was held held that even if it
is found that malicious software was responsible for downloading or storing illegal content
the defendant could still be convicted of knowingly possessing the illegal content. The legal
system relied on the examiner and digital evidence in order to achieve these convictions and
in many cases, the digital forensic tools were accurately being used however, the conclusions
drawn from the evidence were incorrect [11].
2.5 DIGITAL FORENSIC RESEARCH
To date, research questions largely centered on the archaeology of digital artifacts. Digital
forensic artifacts are the result of the physical media, operating system, file system and
user-level applications. Each impacts what digital evidence is created and left behind. Like
archaeologists who seek to understand past human behavior by studying artifacts, digital
forensic investigators seek to understand past behavior in the digital realm by studying
digital artifacts. Because digital forensic research during the past decade focused on the
identification, excavation, and examination of digital artifacts, there is now a relatively solid
understanding of what digital artifacts exist, where they exist, why they exist, and how to
recover them. To its credit, the digital forensic research community shares this knowledge
with other academic disciplines (e.g., computer science, information systems, engineering,
and criminal justice) as well as with the practitioner community (law enforcement, private-
sector practitioners, and e-discovery specialists) [5].
It is time to shift the focus towards developing methods towards retrieving understanding
from these digital artifacts. Much of this work requires the manual skills of the investigator,
given the minimal support from tools to allow the examiners to view the objects in the
system. Evidence uncovered as part of the analysis phase may require the examiner to go
back to the collection phase, and collect evidence, or to the examination phase in order to
enumerate types of objects on the forensic target which were not previously examined [21].
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There are several techniques that have been proposed to analyze programs to create higher-
levels of abstraction. Many of these are designed as tools to assist a developer and are not
fully automated. Some analyze the code and include lexical analysis to organize the source
code into units and provide links between them. Syntactic analysis can create a parse tree,
which allows control flow analysis to be performed to determine the order of instructions
within a procedure and the order of procedures within a program. Data flow analysis can also
be used to show dependence between instructions and variables or a program dependence
graph can be created to show both the control and data flow. A variation of data flow
analysis is slicing, which isolates the instructions that have an effect on a given variable.
Research is also exploring potential techniques to improve the analysis phase. The fidelity
of the hypotheses formulated and conclusions reached based on the evidence provided from
the examination phase. The current state of the Analysis phase is reliant on the ability of
examiners to sift through vast amounts of data to determine the significance of each piece.
There is a great need to research intelligent search, retrieval, and analytical algorithms to aid
this search process. Research in intelligent analytical approaches is relatively scant. Smarter
analytical algorithms would clearly reduce information retrieval overhead. They should help
investigators get relevant data quickly, reduce the noise investigators must wade through,
and help transform data into information and investigative knowledge [5].
In addition, to improving analytical efficiently, intelligent analytical approaches would
enhance analytical effectiveness. Research has shown that data mining algorithms can reveal
data trends and information otherwise undetectable by human observation and analysis.
Indeed, the increased application of artificial intelligence, information science, data mining
and information retrieval algorithms to digital forensics will enable investigators to obtain
unprecedented investigative knowledge [5].
Many researchers also pursue the use of likelihood ratio to express the subjectivity and un-
certainty associated with forensic science evidence. The likelihood ratio (LR) is a statement
which conveys the probability of the observations given each of the stated propositions or
hypotheses h. For example, the likelihood ratio communicates the probability of obtaining
the observed similarities between a fingerprint from a known origin and the fingerprint of
questioned origin under the hypothesis that the two samples have the same origin h1 versus
under the hypothesis that they have different origins h2 [22].
The accused has a constitutional right to have the fact-finder apply a presumption of
innocence to his case. The determination of the prior probability of a hypothesis in the face
of ignorance of information bearing on the truth of the hypotheses. We can make a tentative
assessment of how probable the hypothesis, however, we cannot be sure. A highly contested
topic is whether forensic scientists should try to specify prior probabilities. It is suggested
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that forensic scientists should assume equal prior probabilities based on the Principle of
Indifference [23]. Principle (Principle of Indifference). If there is the unknown reason for
predicting of our subject one rather than another of several alternatives, then relatively to
such knowledge the assertions of each of these alternatives have an equal probability.
Three concerns arise from the use of subjective probabilities. Human beliefs concerning
probabilities are vague, ambiguous, and inaccurate. The impact of this vagueness and ambi-
guity on the outcome of the probabilistic analysis is not fully understood. Lastly, outcome
stemming from the use of subjective probabilities is difficult to explain and validate, which is
crucial in legal applications. It is not unreasonable to question subjective probability values,
the reasons for variability in such values and its magnitude. To facilitate such questioning by
legal professionals, it is helpful to reduce subjective probability values and their variability
to under stable propositions that can be validated [24].
The assignment of likelihood to the hypothesis of digital forensic cases is a just first step
in the formalization of this field. It is impossible the implications of these likelihoods would
have a great impact on the legal system. First, the advantages could impact phases outside
analysis. We could test many hypotheses and if none of them rise above the acknowledge
50% this could mean we have not collected enough evidence and would need more evidence in
order generate a higher likelihood for a certain set of hypothesis. However, do we state that
for the preponderance of the evidence that a hypothesis with greater than 50% likelihood
is fit, if not how do we define that number? Is reasonable doubt assumed with anything
less than 50%? The application of probabilities to digital forensic analysis can provide great
benefit however, there is a need to examine their place in the legal system. This includes
how forensic reports would be written, and how to explain a greater knowledge of statistics
to a lay jury when the requirement of knowledge for merely the digital evidence is vast.
The contributions of this work include:
1. Implementation and evaluation of a multidisciplinary digital forensic education pro-
gram
2. An analysis of reasoning techniques to explore digital evidence
3. An extensible software framework for reasoning about digital evidence that conforms
to the scientific method and the Daubert Standard
4. An indepth discussion on potential techniques that are able to improve the digital
forensic process
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CHAPTER 3: RELATED WORKS
Members of the digital forensics community are concerned by the relative absence of digital
forensics practitioners training [25, 26, 27, 28]. There is a broad need for higher-education
standards and curricula. To address the need for a standardized high-quality digital forensics
education program, this project, in conjunction with the National Science Foundation (NSF),
is developing and piloting a curriculum package in digital forensics suitable for adoption by
other institutions. Research by Woods et al. [29], Ismand and Hamilton [30], Al Amro et
al. [31], describe a technical foundation for the development of digital forensics education
programs. Their scholarly findings provide a basis for this programs development, detailed
below.
3.1 DIGITAL FORENSIC EDUCATION
Research investigators discuss different approaches to introduce digital forensics in higher
education. Chi et al. [32] reported on the challenges of teaching computer forensics at
Florida A&M University to students without a strong technical background. To supplement
the students need for technical knowledge, Chi et al. created preparatory courses for students
to bolster their prerequisite knowledge of computer forensics before introducing the more
technical components of the field. In contrast, Srinivasan [33] described a course on computer
forensics at the University of Louisville available only to computer information systems
studets concentrating on information security. Bashir et al. [34] published research findings
on a more multidisciplinary approach.
Other research investigations focus on building a curriculum around industry needs and
fortifying the employability of their students in fields related to digital forensics. Lius bac-
calaureate program in digital forensics at Metropolitan State University adopted a prac-
titioners model, aimed to prepare students for their target industries [35]. This approach
failed to recruit the necessary qualified faculty for implementing the model. Wassenaar et
al. [36] discusses an approach by Cypress College that prepares students for professional
certification. The program required instructors that are digital forensics practitioners. The
programs credibility relied on instructors abilities to communicate their industry experience.
This projects design and development was influenced by challenges to digital forensics educa-
tion already identified, discussed, and published by Bashir [34], Lang et al. [37], Woods [29],
Walls et al. [38], Beebe [5], Kwan et al. [39], Bishop [40], Craiger et al. [41], Nance et al. [42],
and Barnett —citebarnett1996computer. Further, this project identified challenges faced by
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institutions involved with implementing digital forensics programs. These include: balancing
training and education [43, 44], lack of an adequate textbook on digital forensics [35], finding
qualified faculty [44, 35], lab setup [44, 35], selecting appropriate prerequisites [32, 35], and
absence of widely accepted curriculum standards [45, 46, 47, 48].
3.2 DIGITAL FORENSIC TOOLS
The analysis of digital evidence is performed by evaluating the data to identify digital
evidence that supports an existing theory, that which does not support an existing theory,
and that which shows tampering. Analyzing every bit of data is a daunting task when
confronted with the increasing size of storage systems. In digital forensics, the acquired data
is typically at the lowest and most raw format, which is often too difficult for humans to
understand. The skills required is great and is not efficient to require every forensic analyst
to be able to do so. Currently, we have solved this problem by using tools to translate
data through one or more layers of abstraction until it can be understood. For example, to
view the contents of a directory from a file system image, the file system structures must be
processed so that the appropriate data structures are displayed. The data that represents
the directory contents exists the acquired file system image file, but in a format that is too
low to identify. The directory is a layer of abstraction in the file system [49].
There are many tools that focus on the abstraction of evidence. Examples of these tools
include EnCase [50], SleuthKit [51], Caine [52], Scalpel [53], Forensic Toolkit [54], Registry
Recon [55], Libforensics [56], Cellebrite [57], XRY [58], PlainSight [59], P2 Explorer [60],
Mandiant Redline [61], Xplico [62], Bulk Extractor [63], Oxygen Forensic Suite [64], The
Coroner’s Toolkit [65], Windows Scope [66] and Volatility [67]. However, as the growing size
and proliferation of devices require not only analysis but a correlation of evidence. This has
lead to the development of many tools focused on timeline reconstruction [68].
Zeitline is an open-sourced graphical tool that allows forensic investigators to import
various events and then order and classify them into one or more timelines. Events may be
grouped into super-events, creating a hierarchy of events [14]. FACE [69] expands on this
work by adding automated analysis and correlation of disk images, memory images, network
captures, and configuration files, in order to provide a more coherent view of the state of the
target system and allowing investigators to quickly understand it. The reliance on time has
shown to be a problem. A study that measures and compares the accuracy and effectiveness
of various event reconstruction techniques show they have very high false-positive rates, up
to 96% [70].
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3.3 DIGITAL FORENSIC RESEARCH
A large amount of digital forensics research is being performed at universities and are
funded by organizations suchas the National Science Foundation (NSF), the National In-
stitute of Justice (NIJ) and the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST).
However, there are relatively few cases of academic research being successfully transitioned
to end users. The transition of technology from academia to end users is difficult but is
essential given the scale of the digital forensics problem [4].
Digital forensics research is focused in a few directions, these directions are scalability,
validity, and data abstraction. Most tools are developed and demonstrated on a relatively
small data sets and fail when they are scaled up to real-world sizes. Researchers are failing
to develop a range of techniques that perform well when running in a data-rich environ-
ment [4]. The application of establishing computer science performance paradigms such as
distributed processing [71], datamining-based search process [72], file classification to aid
analysis [73], self-organizing neural networks [74], evidence storage through network-based
architecture and virtualization and threading via graphical processing units (GPUs) [75].
Validity pertains to the ability of research and tools to hold themselves to a level of scientific
testing and reproducibility. New detection algorithms should be reported with a measurable
error rate. The ability of researchers to move up the abstraction ladder, in order to create
a new generation of forensic techniques, tools and procedures to help address the coming
digital forensic crisis these areas focus on identity management, visualization, visual analyt-
ics, collaboration, and autonomous operation [4]. The digital forensic research community
must challenge itself by raising the standards for rigor and relevance of research in digital
forensics [5].
More recently, the literature has begun to explore other methods in order to analyze ev-
idence. Self-Organizing Maps (SOM) is a type of artificial neural network which is used
to visualize low-dimensional views of high-dimensional data. This visualization reveals in-
teresting patterns from data. These patterns are able to aid in the investigator ‘s decision
making. The output of SOM provides excellent visualizations of the evidence. However,
input data to SOM requires data to be manually transformed, with a significant amount of
human labor overhead [76]. The use of Self-Organizing Maps also hasnt been fully explored
in investigator contexts and would need to be further examined.
There is work in automating the process of formulating predictions for hypotheses about
specific types of events. A basic example is chkrootkit [77]. This tool formulates predictions
for the hypothesis that a system has a rootkit installed. To test this hypothesis, the tool
searches for file and system signatures of specific rootkits. It uses incident and system
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characteristics and reconstruction to predict what evidence would exist if a rootkit were
installed.
The DERBI system test hypotheses about different intrusion scenarios [78]. The system
uses evidence schemas to describe what evidence may exist if a sequence of intrusion events
occurred. For example, access times on certain files or modifications to log files. In the
context of the process in this work, the DERBI system uses both system and incident
characteristics to formulate and test hypotheses about a system intrusion. The formalization
model proposed by Leigland and Krings is similar and it describes the components of a system
and the expected evidence that would exist after a specific type of attack [79].
Elsasesser and Tanner developed a system that uses planning to reconstruct events [80].
A computer network is described to the analysis system based on which computers are
connected to each other and what trust exists between them. Host configuration is also
defined in the analysis system. Next, different attack plans are considered and evaluated to
determine if they could have occurred. For example, the software or hardware is tested to
ensure that a specific attack could occur. A simulator can also be used from a known state to
determine if the events occurred. The logs and evidence from the simulated system are then
compared to the logs and evidence from the suspect system. In the context of the process in
this work, the Elsaesser and Tanner system requires that the investigator formulate and test
the system configuration hypotheses. The system then formulates and test different event
hypotheses.
Stallard and Levitt developed a program that formulates consistency-based predictions to
test if the redundant information was inconsistent [81]. These would test a hypothesis that
events occurred to remove evidence. For example, it could process the lastlog file on a Linux
system and determine when each user was logged in. Based on this information, searches
were conducted to identify files that were modified by users during times when, according
to the log file, they were not logged in. A file modified by a user when he was not supposed
to be logged in could be an indication that the lastlog file was modified.
Carney and Rogers used statistical tests to evaluate hypotheses about which program
created a file [82]. The motivation for this approach was to determine if a file was downloaded
by the user or planted there by an attacker. File creation times and references to the files
in question were used as metrics.
To help with general predictions, the Autopsy Forensic Browser tool was modified to make
suggestions for additional searches based on evidence that was found [83]. The investigator
would identify evidence to the tool and it would make suggestions to search for files in the
same directory, with similar temporal data, or similar file names. The goal of these searches
was to find files that were related to the evidence, which is a basic form of reconstruction.
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For example, searching for other files in the same directory or for files with the same creation
time may find files that were installed at the same time.
Spatial outlier analysis has also been used to make predictions for hypotheses about the
existence of files whose attributes were modified to hide the file [83]. The theory behind the
procedure was that some attributes of a file would be statistically different from the other
file attributes in the directory. For example, the times and name could be changed such that
they are consistent with other files in the directory, but the starting block could be much
larger. Predictions were made based on single and multiple attributes. Predictions were also
made to find directories with hidden files.
As the use and complexity of digital devices continues to rise, the field of digital forensics
remains in its infancy. The investigative process is currently faced with a variety of problems,
ranging from the limited number of skilled practitioners, to the difficulty of interpreting
different forms of evidence. Investigators are challenged with leveraging recovered evidence
to find a deterministic cause and effect. Without reliable scientific analysis, judgments made
by investigators can easily be biased, inaccurate and/or unprovable. Conclusions drawn
from digital evidence can vary largely due to differences in their respective forensic systems,
models, and terminology. This persistent incompatibility severely impacts the reliability of
investigative findings as well as the credibility of the forensic analysts. Evidence reasoning
is a fundamental part of investigative efficacy, however, the digital forensic process currently
lacks the scientific rigor necessary to function in this capacity.
The standard for the admissibility of evidence stems from the Daubert trilogy, which
establishes the requirements of relevancy and reliability [84]. NIST describes the general
phases of the forensic process as collection, examination, analysis, and reporting [85]. For-
malization is necessary to ensure consistent repeatability of all investigative scenarios. In
recent years, literature has addressed the need for formalization of the digital forensic pro-
cess, but primarily focused on evidence collection and preservation [81]. Ieong [86] highlights
the need for an explicit, unambiguous representation of knowledge and observations. While
a pedagogical investigative framework exists, there is yet to be a congruous system for digital
evidence reasoning within the examination and analysis phases. Currently, digital forensic
analysts use a variety of methods to develop conclusions about recovered evidence, yet the
results are often marred by conflicting bias or are shrouded in a veil of uncertainty.
There have been numerous proposed reasoning frameworks, typically relying on applied
mathematics, statistics & probabilities as well as, logic. However, before we can employ any
particular methodology, there is a need to examine, review and explore all options in order
to carry out the investigative process with the utmost precision.
15
CHAPTER 4: A SYSTEMATIC REVIEW ON REASONING ABOUT
DIGITAL EVIDENCE
The forensic process relies on the scientific method to scrutinize recovered evidence that
either supports or negates an investigative hypothesis. Currently, analysis of digital evidence
remains highly subjective to the forensic practitioner. Digital forensics is in need of a de-
terministic approach to obtain the most judicious conclusions from evidence. The objective
of this paper is to examine current methods of digital evidence analysis. It describes the
mechanisms for which these processes may be carried out, and discusses the key obstacles
presented by each. Lastly, it concludes with suggestions for further improvement of the
digital forensic process as a whole.
4.1 DIFFERENTIAL ANALYSIS
Differential analysis is described as a method of data comparison used for reporting differ-
ences between two digital objects. Historically, it has been part of computer science for quite
some time. Unix ‘s diff command was implemented in the early 1970 ‘s, and is commonly
used for fast comparison of binary and text files [87]. Continued advancements in hashing
and metadata have since paved the way for more thorough differential analysis. It is flexible
and adaptable to nearly all types of digital objects; Windows Registry hives, binary files, and
disk images can all be compared for evidence of modification or tampering [88]. Nonforensic
applications include security procedures of operating systems, such as Windows use of file
signatures to verify integrity of downloaded driver packages [89].
Modern investigative tools such as EnCase [90], FTK [54] and SleuthKit [91] have incor-
porated modules for streamlining differential analysis of collected evidence, although each
require significant training to become competent with the software features. Garfinkel et
al. [87] formalize a model for differential analysis in the context of digital evidence; two
collected objects a baseline object and a final object are compared for evidence of modifi-
cation both before and after events of interest. Ideally, the process will highlight the most
significant changes made from baseline A to final B, assuming those transformations resulted
from actions taken by the suspect in question. In this context, differential analysis is often
used to detect malware, file and registry modifications [87].
While the strategy of differential analysis is fundamentally the same regardless of which
system level is being examined, each level possesses a certain degree of noise. In discussing
differential analysis, will define noise as information resulting from comparison between
baseline and final that is wholly irrelevant to the investigation.
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A potential form of noise presents itself as benign modifications made to digital objects
resulting from normal operation of a system. For example, an investigator may wish to
examine the presence of a suspicious binary on a particular system apart of an enterprise
network. The investigator selects a disk image of an identical, unmodified system from the
same enterprise network to serve as the baseline for comparison. Differential analysis may
reveal that the image of the system in question is incredibly anomalous compared to the
baseline. This could potentially lead to the injudicious assumption that the most anomalous
system is the most malicious [88], when in reality, it might have only been the result of benign
modifications arising from differences in installed software. While files at the kernel level
are generally protected from tampering, files in user directories are much more vulnerable
to modification.
Although noise is often assumed to be unintentional, it is very possible that it could be
inserted on purpose. When dealing with instances of steganography, differential analysis
compares objects that are known to be hiding information with those that do not. Fiore [92]
describes a framework by which selective redundancy removal can be used to prepare HTML
files for carrying out linguistic steganography. Since the information is being hidden through
the otherwise normal process of HTML file optimization, differential analysis will only appear
to reveal benign occurrences, such as differences in HTML tag styling.
Future research is needed to expand metrics for identifying and accounting for different
forms of noise in digital evidence. Mead [93] explains the National Software Reference
Librarys effort to create a library of hashes of commercial software packages. Through
combining hashing with differential analysis, investigators can drill-down the scope of inquiry
by cross-referencing evidence with a database of known hash values. Eliminating evidence
matching existing hashes can reduce the amount of noise arising from benign objects that
is commonly problematic when dealing with larger systems, and better isolates the few
remaining questionable objects. Further improvement of such databases, robust hashing
algorithms, and perhaps a formal technique would be of benefit to investigators.
4.2 PROBABILISTIC MODELS
Conventional forensic analysis has long included models of statistical inference to assess
the degree of certainty for which hypotheses and corresponding evidence can be causally
linked [94]. This casual linkage is expressed by the following: if a cause is responsible for
effect, and effect has been observed, then cause must have occurred [95]. For example,
researchers know that the probability of two identical DNA fingerprints belonging to two
different individuals is close to one in one billion [94]. If holding an item leaves finger-
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prints on it, and fingerprints found on the weapon at a murder scene match the suspect ‘s
own, then investigators can conclude there is over 99% certainty that the suspect held that
weapon. Because criminal investigations are ultimately abductive, probabilistic techniques
have become widely accepted in the forensic reasoning process [39] [95].
4.2.1 Classical Probability
Several recent criminal investigations have seen classical probability used to reason about
contradicting scenarios regarding the presence of incriminating digital evidence. Examining
two cases originating in Hong Kong, Overill et al. [96] reasoned the likelihood that the
respective defendants intentionally downloaded various forms of child pornography versus
accidentally downloading it among other benign content. In each case, the amount of child
pornography seized was very small compared to the total amount of miscellaneous benign
content, and in both instances were found to have been downloaded over a long period of
time. In each case, it was determined that the probability of unintentionally downloading a
small amount of child pornography is significantly below 10% [96].
While this method can indeed provide a quantitative assessment of the likelihood of guilt,
it is limited to investigations where only few characteristics of the evidential traces are
known. In both examples above, the defendants pleaded guilty, and thus metadata was
disregarded [96]. It was assumed that the incriminating files had been downloaded over
long periods of time, but had metadata been collected, the original hypothesis may have
changed entirely. An example would be the offending content timestamped to a one-hour
browsing period, thus invalidating the original hypothesis of accidental download. The
growing importance of preserving metadata creates the need for probabilistic models that
can integrate it into reasoning.
4.2.2 Bayesian Networks
In the last decade, Bayesian inference has gained popularity in the scientific community.
Unlike frequentist inference that reasons with frequencies of past events, Bayesian inference
reasons with subjective beliefs estimates, and allows room for new evidence to revise these
beliefs [95]. Kwan et al. [39] introduced the idea of reasoning about digital evidence in
the form of Bayesian networks: directed acyclic graphs whose leaf nodes represent observed
evidence and interior nodes represent unobserved causes. The root node represents the
central hypothesis to which all unobserved causes serve as sub-hypotheses. The model
uses Bayes ‘theorem to determine the conditional probability of evidence E resulting from
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hypothesis H:
P (E|H) = P (E)P (H|E) (4.1)
P (E) is the prior probability of evidence E; P (H) is the prior probability of H when no
evidence exists; P (H|E) is the posterior probability such that H has occurred when E is
detected.
The construction of a Bayesian model begins with the defining of a root hypothesis. An
example would be The seized computer was used to send this malicious file. The possible
states of the hypothesis Yes, No, and Uncertain are assigned equal probabilities. As
more evidence is discovered, sub-hypotheses and their corresponding probabilities are added
beneath the root hypothesis. The process is repeated until refinement produces a most likely
hypothesis.
However, Bayesian networks are dependent on the assignment of prior probabilities to
posterior evidence [39]. In scenarios where uncertainty is present, fuzzy logic method-
ology is incorporated to quantify likelihood as a value between 1 (absolute truth) and 0
(false) [97]. The case study presented in [39] based its prior probabilities on results from
questionnaires sent to several law enforcement agencies. Since human-computer interactions
are non-deterministic, there is no systematic way to reason posterior evidential probabilities
with complete certainty; conditional probabilities inferred from demonstrably normal behav-
ior of one network might differ with those from another. Discrepancies in prior evidential
probabilities can significantly impact the overall outcome of the Bayesian network, and thus,
there is difficulty in soundly applying this method to digital forensic investigations.
4.2.3 Dempster-Shafer Theory
One of the limiting factors of using Bayesian analysis in security is that it requires the
assignment of prior and conditional probabilities for the nodes in the reasoning model. Often
times, the numbers are very hard to obtain. For example, how does one compute the prior
probability for a particular registry key being modified? As another example, how does one
compute the conditional probability of a particular registry key being modified given that
the malware did not gain privileged access? Bayesian analysis works very well when the
reasoning structure is well known and the probabilities are easy to obtain. In the real world,
it is very hard to obtain those numbers and there is a high degree of uncertainty in the
obtained evidence.
Dempster-Shafer theory (DST) is a reasoning technique that provides a way to encode
19
uncertainty more naturally [98]. Contrasting with Bayesian analysis, DST does not require
one to provide a prior probability for the hypothesis of interest. DST also does not require
the use of conditional probabilities thus addressing the other major limitation of Bayesian
analysis techniques. The presence of certain evidence during forensic analysis does not
necessarily indicate a malicious activity. For example, a change in registry key could be
either due to a malware or by a benign application. There is always a degree of uncertainty
in the obtained evidence at any given stage of the forensic analysis process. DST enables one
to account for this uncertainty by assigning a number to a special state of the evidence don ‘t
know. For example, a sequence of registry key modifications might indicate that a malware
of specific family might have been downloaded. Based on empirical evidence, let us assume
one believes that with 10% confidence. A probabilistic interpretation would then mean that
one would believe that there is a 90% chance that the malware was not downloadedwhich is
not intuitive. When using DST one would assign 10% to the hypothesis that the malware
was downloaded and 90% to the hypothesis that I am not sure.
One can explain the difference between DST and probability theory using a coin toss
example. When tossing a coin with unknown bias probability theory will assign a probability
value of 0.5 to both the outcomes Head and Tail. This representation does not capture the
inherent uncertainty in the outcome. DST, on the other hand, will assign 0 to the outcomes
Head and Tail while assigning a value of 1 to the set Head, Tail. This exactly captures the
reasoning process of a human in that when you toss a coin (with unknown bias) the only
thing you are sure about the outcome is that it could be either Head or Tail. In general,
when calculating the likelihood of a hypothesis DST allows admittance of ignorance on the
confidence of evidence. DST provides rules for combining multiple evidences to calculate
the overall belief in the hypothesis. The challenge of using DST is analogous to Bayesian
analysis, though much better, in that no prior values have to be assigned to evidences.
4.3 EVENT RECONSTRUCTION MODELS
The ability to reconstruct events is of great importance to the digital forensic process.
AlKuwari and Wolthusen [99] proposed a general framework to reconstruct missing parts of
a target trace. This can be used for various areas of an investigation. This algorithm graphs
a multi-modal scenario, determining all of possible routes connecting the gaps of a specific
trace. Additional information may be included in the graph and marked appropriately. The
broadcast algorithm used to determine all possible routes may require exponential time,
suggesting that the search area should be bounded [99].
This approach relies on a specific target and would best be used to determine if an attack
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on a system occurred. However, this approach poses problems for the algorithm if a specific
target is not identified. Event reconstruction is not unique to digital forensics, and the ability
to apply existing techniques could yield effective results.
4.3.1 Finite State Machines
Modern computer systems are often modeled as a series of finite states, graphically pre-
sented as a Finite State Machine (FSM). It is expressed as the quintuple M = (Q,Σ, δ, s0, F ),
where:
• Q is the finite, non-empty set of machine states
• Σ is the finite, non-empty alphabet of event symbols
• δ: Q×Σ← Q is the transition function mapping events between machine states in Q
for each event symbol in Σ
• s0Q is the starting state of the machine
• F ⊆ Q is the set of final machine states
• Nodes represent possible system states
• Arrows represent transitions between states [10] Gladyshev and Patel [100] introduced a
formalization of this model into digital forensics. By back-tracing event states, investigators
are presented with a reconstruction of events and can thus select the timeline most relevant
to the available evidence.
For finite state machine models to perform accurately comprehensive event reconstruction,
investigators must be able to account for all possible system states. Complex events, such
as those resulting from advanced persistent threats, are incredibly difficult to analyze. In
addition, changing factors such as software updates may affect the resulting machine states.
Carrier [10] proposes the development of a central repository for hosting information about
machine events. Likening it to existing forensic databases on gun cartridges, an exhaustive,
continuously updated library of system events would be of invaluable aide to investigators
performing event reconstruction. However, an investigator may wish to explore other char-
acteristics of events, such as the odds of a particular investigative hypothesis, or the real
time distributions of reconstructed events. To compute answers to such questions, the for-
malization of event reconstruction must be extended with additional attributes that describe
statistical and real-time properties of the system and incident [100].
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4.4 COMBINING PROBABILITY WITH EVENT RECONSTRUCTION
Attack graphs are typically used for intrusion analysis, where each path represents a unique
method of intrusion by a malicious actor. It is possible to use attack graph techniques in
the event reconstruction process. Attack graphs are directed graphs where nodes represent
pre and post conditions of machine events, and directed edges are conditions met between
these nodes; the root node represents the singular event of interest to which all other nodes
serve as precursors [101].
While attack graphs are helpful in identifying mechanisms of intrusion, their lacking of
any probabilistic inference hinders their usefulness in quantitative evidential reasoning. In-
vestigators presented with attack graphs must select the most probable attack scenarios,
but there are currently no clear metrics for assessing likelihood. To address this, Xie et
al. [102] combined attack graphs with Bayesian networks. By transferring attack graphs
into acyclic Bayesian networks, this method utilizes conditional probability tables for nodes
with parents, and prior probabilities for nodes without parents.
Like in regular Bayesian networks, this approach relies on the investigator supplying ac-
curate conditional and prior probabilities for each event. Estimating prior probabilities has
traditionally relied on feedback from the community in the form of surveys. This becomes
incredibly difficult as scale increases; a large attack graph would require that the investigator
survey and obtain probability information for every unique event, making analysis costly.
4.5 DISCUSSION
Evidence reasoning models are an important part of the forensic process. Unlike traditional
forensic sciences, digital forensics deals almost exclusively with objects of nondeterministic
nature; there is great difficulty in analyzing and scrutinizing digital evidence. Fundamen-
tal flaws hinder current evidence analysis models in their ability to assess accurately the
likelihood of crime occurrence. Furthermore, conclusions based on probabilities complicate
explanations in the courtroom, as demonstrated in the legal arguments surrounding Shon-
ubi I-V [103]. These flaws must be identified and understood to avoid the possibility of
injudicious assumptions resulting from the forensic process.
Differential analysis of digital evidence becomes difficult when the scope of investigation
is widened; unintentional noise in the form of benign modifications may lead to dubious
conclusions about system integrity. Furthermore, recent obfuscation techniques have suc-
cessfully averted detection by traditional methods. Event reconstruction models are limited
in their ability to provide investigators with clear attack scenarios, because they rely on the
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exhaustive identification of possible machine states; there is yet to be a resource providing
such information. Probabilistic reasoning models rely on prior probabilities known to the
investigator, which have so far mainly been determined from surveying others in the field.
Besides the obvious expenditure of time and effort in conducting such surveys, it is reckless
to underestimate the potential for entropy and reason that small samples of observed prob-
abilities hold true for all investigations. It can be concluded that each of these techniques is
only applicable to a small niche of forensic scenarios.
The increasing rate of software development places a burden on forensic examiners to
keep up with the latest software packages, both commercial and free. Each of the models
discussed in this paper lacks a comprehensive database of information to conduct analysis
with the highest accuracy. We highlight the need for a community-driven, updated catalogue
of file hashes, machine states, and probability metrics for use in forensic analysis. The
changing nature of technology and software necessitates that researchers and law enforcement
collaborate to ensure the digital forensic process is as reliable as possible.
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CHAPTER 5: DIGITAL FORENSIC EDUCATION INITIATIVE
The Information Trust Institute (ITI) at the University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign
is developing an entirely new multidisiplinary undergraduate curriculum focused on digital
forensics. A preliminary plan for the introductory course was presented to a workshop of
digital forensic experts in May 2013 and received strong approval [34].
To help address the need for qualified digital forensics professionals, we developed an
adoptable curriculum. With the goal is to distribute it as a self-contained curriculum pack-
age. This includes an instructor handbook, a lab instructor handbook, lecture slides, and
question sets. This will be a significant contribution to the digital forensics education com-
munity [26]. When complete, the program will consist of an introductory, and advanced
course in digital forensics with accompanying hands-on laboratory sessions, and a special
topics course. The introductory course is accessible to a wide range of students from many
disciplines and valuable as a stand-alone offering. The second course is more technically
intensive, but it is intended to be accessible and valuable to students from non-technical
disciplines [104].
This DF program is not necessarily a job-track training program intended to prepare
students to directly enter the job market as digital forensic examiners and analysts. In-
stead, it provides a broadly applicable education in the field of digital forensics that will be
valuable for students going into many disciplines related to digital forensics, such as law,
in addition to forensic analysts. It is expected that these students will receive additional
education training specific to their career paths and some on-the-job training specific to
their eventual professional roles. At the time of writing, this project developed curriculum
for the introductory and advanced course. The pilot courses of both were taught and in
the process of curriculum revision for distribution to other institutions [26]. The content
includes modules developed collaboratively by faculty experts in multiple fields of computer
science, law, psychology, social sciences, and accountancy. The content of this program is
modeled on the NSA/DHS CAE Digital FOrensic Working Group proposal for a standard-
ized DF curriculum [105]. The core curriculum development team includes Illinois faculty
members Masooda Bashir (an expert on the psychology of cyber-crime); Roy H. Campbell
(a computer security expert); Syed Faisal Hasan (a networking expert); Jay P. Kesan (a las
professor with expertise in technology law); Anna-Maria Marshall (an expert on the civil
and criminal justice systems, from the Department of Sociology); Frank Nekrasz (an expert
on fraud invesitgation from the Department of Accountancy in the College of Business);
David M. Nicole and William H. Sanders (experts on secure and trustworthy computing
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and networking from the Department of Electricial and Computer Engineering); and Jana
Sebestik (a K-12 outreach expert from the College of Education).
5.1 METHODOLOGY
The vision and strategy for this standardized Digital Forensics education curriculum pro-
poses that digital forensics would be best suited as a specialization within a technical domain.
The curriculum design envisioned a three-course sequence. The hallmarks of the program in-
clude a multidisciplinary approach to digital forensics education. Also, domain experts from
multiple fields related to digital forensics develop and teach the curriculum. The course work
is modular and portable. Also, live evaluation feedback of the curriculum and teaching was
part of the entire design for this project from the beginning. The modules are combined to
form a coherent narrative and introduce students to the complex and multiple dynamics of
digital forensics. The laboratory assignments from the project ‘s introductory course solely
use open source content. Further, the modular course content is designed with the intention
of being easily adaptable and integrated at various educational institutions.
Digital Forensics is essentially multidisciplinary encompassing evidence collection, evi-
dence preservation, evidence presentation, forensic preparation [26] the research team for
this project is also multidisciplinary and includes computer science, electrical and computer
engineering, criminal justice, law, psychology, and educational assessment experts. The
proposed curriculum introduces students to various application areas of digital forensics, in-
cluding topics such as fraud investigation and digital archives, with the aim of demonstrating
the breadth of application for diverse knowledge in the field. The sections below will detail
the specifics for Digital Forensics 1, and Digital Forensics 2.
To satisfy the multidisciplinary aims of this two-course curriculum sequence, professors
and experts in digital forensics and related fields deliver subject-specific course material
during lectures. The fields of study mentioned above, including technical and non-technical
topics, were carefully chosen as the result of an extensive review of literature that outlined
relevant intersecting topics in the expansive field of digital forensics. Experts, who attended
the Digital Forensics Research Workshop (DFRWS 2011 2013), confirmed the accuracy of
structuring the course to include these specific fields.
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5.2 DIGITAL FORENSICS 1
Digital Forensics 1 is an introductory course designed to offer an initial overview of the field
to students from a broad range of disciplines. Designing a digital forensics curriculum that
is appropriate for a large target audience creates particular problems and challenges. It is
difficult for a single class to offer a comprehensive introduction to a field as complex as digital
forensics; however, the pilot course covered the major forensics related fields computer,
network, and mobile device precisely because its pedagogical strategy focuses on education
rather than training.
The introductory course was taught in 2013 and 2014. The classes consisted of two 75-
minute lecture sessions and an hour-long laboratory session each week for a 16-week term.
To create a multidisciplinary and modular-based curriculum to correspond with the multi-
disciplinary nature of the field, the project assembled a development team to include domain
experts in computer security, computer networks, law, civil and criminal justice, fraud inves-
tigation, and psychology. This approach allows the content developers to receive feedback
from student interactions and more efficiently revise their materials. Various modules were
combined to form a coherent narrative and introduce students to various perspectives of the
field.
The learning objectives that guided the curriculum development were that students should
understand:
• Common terminology, techniques, and investigative procedures of digital forensics, in-
cluding the related disciplines of computer forensics, network forensics, and mobile
device forensics
• Applications of the scientific method to digital forensics investigation and its importance
• Various types of digital forensics evidence acquired and the limitations of current tech-
niques
• Basic operations of the U.S. justice system and court proceedings
• Areas related to digital forensics, such as data recovery, psychology, cybercrime, and
fraud examination
5.3 DIGITAL FORENSICS 2
Digital Forensics 2 (DF2) is an advanced lecture and lab course designed to offer students
an in-depth look at particular multidisciplinary topics related to digital forensics. The class
consists of two 50-minute lecture sessions and two hour-long laboratory sessions each week
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for a 16-week term. The learning objectives that guided the curriculum development were
that students:
• Should be familiar with the known barriers and challenges in digital forensics research
• Should be able to use their investigative skills in real world scenarios
• Should be able to contribute research to the digital forensics community
DF2 includes greater focus on technical topics and more rigorous laboratory assignments than
the introductory course. It also requires students to complete a research project. Notably,
despite recent consumer trends, research continues to neglect the forensics of non-Windows
operating systems, file systems, and user applications. The course aims to encourage students
to research Linux, Mac, and iOS operating systems as they become increasingly prominent
in our daily lives. Students understanding of multiple operating systems contributes to their
ability to adapt the digital forensics investigative process for use in different systems.
Another design decision that is important to the curriculum and this advanced course is the
inclusion and option for students to learn in a virtual laboratory environment. The program
established a virtualized laboratory called ISLET. ISLET allows professors to demonstrate
various digital forensics tools and students to complete their laboratory exercises remotely.
ISLET is a container-based virtualization system for teaching Linux-based software with
minimal participation and configuration effort. The participation barrier is set very low,
and students need only a Secure Shell (SSH) client in order to participate [106].
Inspired by the extensive range of open research questions in the field of digital forensics,
this curriculum requires students to contribute to solutions rather than only learn about
the issues. To achieve this end students chose a topic for a semester-long research project.
Students were guided to design manageable and relevant research topics and were provided
with a list of research project ideas. Students formed groups and submitted a project
proposal. Each proposal was scrutinized to establish feasibility and likelihood of contributing
to digital forensics research and/or education community. The midterm progress report
indicates whether students are on-track for the semester. Significantly, the report reveals any
particular challenges experienced by the students at that point in the semester. This offers
an opportunity for instructors to help students develop strategies for addressing challenges as
they continue working on their projects. Near the end of the semester, students present their
research projects in the form of oral presentations to their peers and instructors. Ultimately,
they submit final project reports.
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5.4 EVALUATION METHODOLOGIES
The construction, modifications, and updates to the curriculum are based on workshops,
surveys, student evaluations and performance. The construction of the initial curriculum
vision is based on summaries of a series of workshops (the proceedings are now in press)
that included experts in the field of digital forensics. Findings and guidance gathered from
these workshops significantly added to the curriculum development process. An external
evaluation team was hired to conduct a formal evaluation of the initiative by providing:
1. Ongoing feedback to inform the implementation and delivery of the curriculum
2. Comprehensive assessment of program effectiveness and outcome attainment
Being responsive to the multiple groups of individuals involved with the initiative helps
to legitimize a diversity of perspectives and experiences and contribute to a comprehensive
understanding of the curriculum being developed. To that end, the evaluation design includes
both quantitative and qualitative methods developed in collaboration with the initiatives
leadership team.
Three student surveys were developed, which were distributed throughout the academic
semester. The initial paper-based survey is administered to registered students during the
first week of the course. Its purpose is to gather initial information about enrolled students,
including major, technical background, ethnicity, and gender. The second survey is admin-
istered mid-course and online after the midterm exam. This survey records how students
are experiencing the course. The third survey is an end course survey administered online
during the last week of class. Its aim is to gather information about students perspectives,
experiences, and suggestions. All surveys include multiple-choice questions whereby stu-
dents indicate their level of agreement with a statement on a scale from 1 to 5. Surveys also
included open-ended items, inviting students to include additional comments about specific
aspects of the course.
The evaluation team observed most of the lecture and lab sessions. The purpose of these
observations was to assess the delivery of the curriculum content, and students engagement
and experience with the course. Information related to the following categories was noted
during the observations:
1. Social or interpersonal setting: how groups and individuals were situated
2. Activities: a systematic description of activities and timeframes
3. Content: a description of resources and materials used and discussed
4. Interactions: a description of student-professor verbal and nonverbal interactions
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Group or individual interviews were conducted in the middle and at the end of the course
to explore students experiences, reactions to, and opinions on the course in detail. Each
group or individual interview involved a dialogue between students and one of the evaluators,
who prompted conversations about course-related topics. In an effort to maintain student
confidentiality and privacy, there were no members of the courses staff or instructors present
during the interviews.
5.5 RESULTS, OPPORTUNITIES, CHALLENGES
This project found Digital Forensics to be a complex curriculum to teach in a higher
education institution. This curriculum model and course outlines contribute to a stronger
basis for a standardized curriculum. The results are based on teaching the first course
twice and the second course once and the results are supplemented with evaluations, surveys
and exam results. Below is a summary of the projects findings so far, commenting on
opportunities to improve the curriculum, and outlining some challenges that remain.
5.5.1 Findings About Students
The program attracted students from various majors, including law, psychology, math,
computer engineering, and computer science. Perhaps unsurprisingly, a major problem with
designing a curriculum for multiple majors is that there was a wide difference in students
expectations. Students with a technical background desired to learn more about technical
topics, and typically they failed to understand the importance of non-technical topics. Stu-
dents with a non-technical background and interest tended to appreciate the course overall;
however, they struggled with the technical concepts and assignments of the course. The large
number of possible careers includes digital forensics analyst, examiner, practitioner, security
specialist, expert witness, security researcher, digital archivist, and fraud investigator added
to student expectations. We further display the findings of the students in Figures 5.1, 5.2.
5.5.2 Team Development of a Course
Lacking any individual with the full range of Digital Forensics expertise, the course se-
quence is team-taught. The project struggled to present a cohesive course and maintain
course integrity related to the differing approaches of the team. Multiple professors did
achieve the aim to provide students with a broader understanding of the topics presented.
However, many students failed to grasp all of the connections. The intention for the final
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Figure 5.1: Results from the End of the Year Survey for Digital Forensics 1 in Fall 2014
product is that one instructor will be able to teach all the materials. Part of this project
involves providing background material as a teaching aid.
5.5.3 Digital Forensics Theory and Practice
Approaching Digital Forensics education using a scientific approach requires evaluation
of methods and experimental results. However, scientifically evaluating Digital Forensics
methods and reasoning about that evidence using logic is immature in theory and in practice.
The project introduced a module in Digital Forensics 2 on Reasoning about Evidence with the
intention of promoting a more scientific approach to digital forensics research than was offered
in the introductory course. The following challenges resulted from this approach. First, the
time limitations of a 16-week course limited covering several topics in depth. Second, digital
forensics practitioners, educators, and researchers identified that a robust scientific basis for
the evaluative methods involved with digital forensics investigations was ongoing research.
The Scientific Working Group on Digital Evidence (SWGDE) [48], for instance, have released
several documents since 1999 concerning digital forensics standards, best practices, testing,
and validation processes, and these were considered in the development of our curriculum.
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Figure 5.2: Results from the End of the Year Survey for Digital Forensics 2 in Spring 2015
Additionally, in 2001, the U.S. National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) [107]
began the Computer Forensic Tool Testing (CFTT) Project. It subsequently established
and implemented validation test protocols for several digital forensics tools. Moreover, DF2
includes a module entitled tool validation but remains challenging because tool evaluation
technologies are unavailable.
The first Digital Forensics Research Workshop (DFRWS 2011) initiated a gathering of over
50 researchers, investigators, and analysts. It aimed to establish a research community that
would apply the scientific method in finding focused near-term solutions that were based on
practitioner requirements. The community addressed future aims for developing the field
of digital forensics. The related curriculum emphasizes the need to bring rigorous scientific
methodological approaches to evidence evaluation. One example is fuzzy logic, a particular
form of reasoning about digital evidence. Fuzzy logic allows elements to be identified as true
or false to some degree. A fuzzy engine provides a solution to human errors (such as word
misspellings) that might skew the results of analysis by selecting an acceptable degree of
fuzziness. A fuzzy expert system regards a misspelled or mistaken word as input and then
finds relationships for it with other similar words.
31
5.5.4 Project Opportunities
The Digital Forensics 2 advanced course implements a semester-long research project. This
provided the students with opportunities to explore different concerns of Digital Forensics.
For example, several students decided to develop a case study as their research project
that will be available to other institutions to be used in future work and may also be
incorporated into the next iteration of the introductory course, Digital Forensics 1. A group
interested in social media investigated the amount of shared information by considering
application programming interfaces that could potentially be used to extract data about
individuals. The project involves the creation of a correlation engine that would be able
to demonstrate a connection between application programming interfaces and the ability
to extract information about an individual from an online environment. Another group
of students introduced digital forensics to high school students. Modeled on their own
abbreviated curriculum they also created challenge exercises for the high school students.
The goal of the students is to produce outcomes of their project that will contribute to
outreach programs that engage students of all ages in digital forensics education. Yet another
research group designed a lab for students to examine Mac operating system malware and
relevant legal aspects of an investigation.
5.5.5 The Laboratory Environment: Results and Challenges
ISLET is an orchestration tool for education and training built around Docker. It pro-
vides custom interactive command-line environments quickly to a user via a shell. It solves
a number of the problems associated with virtual machine and shared Unix system training,
including the deployment and distribution of large virtual machine files, scalability, mutabil-
ity of training materials, and account management. Its components include a user interface,
an account manager, a container maintenace process, and a deployment configuration. It
reduces the administrative burden of creating and distributing training images to a simple
process that involves creation of a Docker image and an ISLET configuration file.
Limitations of ISLET include the fact that is it bound to a system supporting Docker,
currently a 64-bit GNU/Linux machine, which means that software for other operating
systems is not supported. However, it is anticipated that future work will enable support
for FreeBSD using ZFS and jails, and other GNU/Linux-based userland container runtimes,
to avoid solely relying on Docker. Also, ISLET excels at training in which users are given
an interactive command-line shell or interface from which they can gain practical experience
with software. However, although it can support X11 applications and provider user-facing
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services such as web server training from containers, support is limited, and at this time
these features are experimental.
The collaborative virtual lab environment also led to some challenges. It requires students
to be knowledgeable about the Linux command-line, which is a challenge for many non-
technical students. This will hopefully be overcome in the future by designing a laboratory
assignment based on an introduction to the Linux command-line.
5.5.6 Evaluation Methodology Challenges
The evaluation progressed with some challenges. As the aim of the evaluation is to provide
ongoing feedback to the initiatives leadership team, a mid-course survey is administered to
students during each course. Much of the feedback provided by students is related to the
structural organization of the course, which is not feasible to change in the middle of the
semester. Another challenge is the variability in student participation. Encouraging students
to participate in surveys and interviews was difficult as students participation declines closer
to the end of the semester. Different strategies are being explored to maintain and encourage
student participation. Another challenge is that the data gathered are representative of the
perspectives and experiences of students enrolled at a particular university. As an alpha
version of the curriculum is in the process of being distributed, the goal is to also gather data
from institutions adopting the curriculum. Gathering a broad range of data will potentially
provide support for the initiatives goal of the curriculums acceptance as a national standard.
The course enrolls students from various majors, including law, psychology, math, com-
puter engineering, and computer science. Conducting course and lab session observations
yielded a significant amount of insight about the curriculum being implemented. First, these
observations offered an immediate impression of how the courses are progressing, which
informs and further enlightens data gathered from surveys and interviews. For instance,
during the evaluation of the introductory course in the fall of 2014, it was observed that
students struggled with answering and finishing lab assignments. Students were asked in an
open-ended question format about the pace and structure of the lab, especially if they were
dissatisfied with the lab section. Second, conducting observations allowed for the evaluation
team to further understand the curriculum because it was situated within a classroom en-
vironment. Observing the curriculums implementation and development progress revealed
how it was being structured, delivered and received by students. Third, classroom pres-
ence, for the purposes of observation, helped to build rapport between the evaluation team
and enrolled students. Conducting observations is time consuming, but it is an important
method as it helps to situate the program overall.
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This proposed project offers a standardized multidisciplinary curriculum model for digital
forensics education. It is being made available to institutions for adoption. This project
transformed the multidisciplinary undergraduate education at a Midwest university in the
United States by institutionalizing this program and the collaborations upon which it is
built. In accordance with the multidisciplinary nature of the field of digital forensics, the
curriculum development team included domain experts in computer security, computer net-
works, law, civil and criminal justice, fraud investigation, and psychology. The modular
approach to curriculum development is organized by a three-course digital forensics educa-
tion sequence, and the modules are combined to form a coherent narrative, thus exposing
students to multiple perspectives on digital forensics. The curriculum package provides a
strong theoretical foundation for the techniques learned by the students as well as an array
of studies in fields related to digital forensics. Hopefully this paper will initiate a con-
versation with the international community, note that standards need to continue to be
developed for digital forensics curriculum, and recognize the multidisciplinary need for this
field of study. This project, curriculum, and course outline are available on the website
http://publish.illinois.edu/digital-forensics/ and a content package containing
all of these materials have been to the schools listed in Table 5.1.
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Wilmington University Bellevue University
Mount Hood Community College Air Force Institute of Technology
Excelsing College San Bernardino Valley College
University of South Alabama University of Houston at Clear Lake
National Security Agency (NSA) Jackson State Community College
Liberty University Radford University
Saint Martin's University Fairleigh Dickinson University
University of Maryland University College Eastern Washington University
Ivy Tech Community College Mery College
Tulse Technology Center Fordham University
California University of Pennsylvania Iowa State University
Washington University in St. Louis Daytona State University
Rochester Institute of Technology Purdue University
Moraine Valley Commmunity College University of Central Florida
Champlain Community College University of Central Oklahoma
Oregon State University University of Nebraska at Omaha
Florida Institute of Technology Ivy Tech Community College of Indiana
University of Kansas University of Texas at San Antonio
Marshall University Roane State Community College
Delta College
Table 5.1: The different community colleges, colleges & universities in use of the digital
forensics curriculum.
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CHAPTER 6: THE SCIENTIFIC METHOD AND THE DIGITAL
FORENSIC PROCESS
There is great difficulty in analyzing digital evidence, this is only further complicated
by failures in the investigative mindset. Failures in the criminal investigative process can
lead to unsolved crimes, unsuccessful prosecutions, unpunished offenders, and wrongful
convictions[108]. There are common failures that lead to errors in the reasoning process.
We will identify key areas of potential error in the digital forensic process.
6.1 THE FORENSIC PROCESS MODEL
Computer forensic methodologies consist of these main components, also known as the
three As [109].
• Acquisition: The evidence while ensuring that the integrity is preserved
• Authentication: The validity of the extracted data, which involves making sure that it
is as valid as the original
• Analysis: The data while keeping its integrity
There are many process models that combine the three As [110] including the Forensics
Process Model [2], the Abstract Digital Forensics Model [111] and the Integrated Digital
Investigation Model [112].
6.2 INVESTIGATIVE FAILURES
Individuals view the world differently and these differences a creates mindsets. These
mindsets are quick to form and hard to change. These mindsets are dangerous in the
generating of a hypothesis. A hypothesis is generated based on mindset and not entirely
on the evidence. This bias can lead to serious investigative failures. Tunnel vision develops
from a narrow focus. Tunnel vision results in the elimination of hypothesis without thorough
vetting. Tunnel version can allow to go down a mistaken course. People estimate the
likelihood of an event by recalling a comparable incident and assuming the likelihood of the
two are similar. This heuristic is partly prompted by the urge to categorize everything. The
similarity in one aspect, however, does not imply similarity in others [108].
Perceptions of cause and effect are susceptible to several mental biases. Crime linkage
could be undermined if an investigator fails to differentiate internal (psychological) from ex-
ternal (situation) causes of behavior when examining offender modus operandi. The identity
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fallacy holds that big events must have big causes. Illusory correlations can prove misleading
on several levels. Events may appear correlated when, in fact, they are not. And, even, if
they are connected, correlation does not always equal causation. The relationship may be
spurious or caused by an intervening event. The relationship may be spurious or caused
by an intervening event. Confirmation bias constitutes a type of selective thinking whereby
individuals notice or search for evidence that confirms their theory while ignoring or refus-
ing to look for contradicting information. Efforts to only verify and not falsify a hypothesis
often fail. After all, a single item of refuting data (e.g., DNA exclusion) can outweigh a mass
of evidence against a suspect. The components of confirmation bias include failure to seek
evidence (e.g., a suspect’s alibi) that would disprove the theory, failure to use such infor-
mation if found, failure to consider alternative hypotheses, and failure to evaluate evidence
diagnostically. Investigators often fail to account for the absence of evidence, something that
can prove quite important under certain circumstances [108].
We hope to limit digital forensic investigative failures through the quantification of the
reasoning process. Reasoning begins with a hypothesis whose validity needs to be established.
The task then is to quantify the uncertainty in the hypothesis ascribed to corroborate and
collaborate multiple events that are relevant to the investigation. Give a list of hypotheses
sorted by confidence and annotated by digital evidential support for each hypothesis, it would
be very easy for a human analyst to decide which hypotheses deserve further investigation.
The key question then is how to calculate a hypothesis’ likelihood of being true based on
both the reasoning structure from which it is derived and the evidence that supports it.
There have been few attempts to achieve this goal specifically.
There exist fundamental flaws that currently hinder the development and establishment
of evidence analysis models. These flaws must be identified and understood to avoid the
possibility of injudicious assumptions resulting from the forensic process [17].
In graph theory, the degree of a vertex in a graph is the number of connections it has to
other vertices. The degree distribution is the probability distribution of the known degrees
over the entire graph. Centrality is an indicator of the most important vertices within a
graph. The concept of centrality aims to quantify the influence of a vertex in a graph.
We also rely on link analysis to aid in the examination process. Link analysis is a data
analysis technique used to evaluate relationships between vertices. Relationships may be
identified among various types of vertices, including organizations, people, and transaction.
Link analysis has been used for investigation of criminal activity, computer security analysis,
search engine optimization, market research, medical research, and art.
Previous digital forensic methods fail to find information that is anomalous or even slightly
altered [4]. Graph theory is able to determine possible correlations among the evidence. This
37
is achieved through analysis of the graphs. As we analyze the graph, we are able to interpret
more from the evidence.
6.3 SCIENTIFIC METHOD
The scientific method is used as a process to formulate and test hypotheses. The general
process has four phases.
• Observation: information and resources relevant to the investigation are collected and
observed.
• Hypothesis formulation: based on the observations, hypotheses are formulated about
the system. Different levels of hypotheses will be formulated over the course of the
investigation.
• Evaluate Hypotheses: To support or refute a hypothesis, predictions about what evi-
dence will exist are made.
• Report Results: Based on the evidence predictions, tests and searches are conducted.
These phases can be see in Figure 6.1.
6.3.1 Observe Evidence
In the observation phase, an investigator, or program, makes observations about states
and events for the purpose of formulating a hypothesis. Sources of observations include data
defined in the inferred history and output from analysis tool. Some examples are given here:
The list of running processes is observed using the ps tool The list of files in a directory is
observed using a specialized investigation tool The contents of an e-mail are observed in an
e-mail client This phase is equivalent to an investigator looking at a physical crime scene.
In a digital crime scene, the investigator must rely on hardware and software to observe
data [10].
In both the physical and digital world, there are different types of observations. A direct
observation occurs when a component is aware of something based on its sense (i.e. it is the
observer). An indirect observation occurs when a component is aware of something based on
the observations of other components. A component can be software, hardware, or a person
and sense for hardware or software include any form of data input [10].
For example, an investigator can directly observe the state of a monitor because he can
see it, but he cannot directly observe the digital state of a hard disk sector. When a
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Figure 6.1: The Scientific Method
program displays the contents of a hard disk to the screen, the investigator is making a
direct observation of the monitor and an indirect observation of the hard disk sector. An
indirect observation would also occur if someone told the investigator about the contents of
the sector [10].
In general, the investigator trusts direct observations over indirect observations because
he trusts his sense more than other components or people. Trust is a belief in the accuracy
and reliability of a component. Because indirectly observed data are not fact, the accuracy
of the observed data should be tested when the data are used to formulate hypotheses. The
amount of testing will depend on how much trust has been placed in each component. If
the software and hardware being used to indirectly observe the state of a hard disk sector
have reliably produced accurate data in the past then the investigator may not test each
observation. If the software is new and has not been reliably used or if it is from an untrusted
system then the investigator will be more likely to test the observation.
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In current systems, all important observations that an investigator makes of digital states
are indirect because the state of output controllers are not frequently of direct relevance to
him. This means that he must evaluate the accuracy of nearly every observation. Consider
if he used an automated analysis that formulates and test hypotheses about various states
and events. The program stores the data that have been defined in the inferred history and
displays the results [10].
A body of evidence can be graphically represented using a graph G = (V,E) where V is
a set of vertices E is a set of directed edges. Each component is a vertex and an edge exists
from vertex a to vertex b if information flows from a to b. Component b can directly observe
component a if a line exists from a to b. Component b can directly observe component a if
a line exists from a to b. Component c can indirectly observe component a if a path exists
from a to c and c cannot directly observe a [10].
Graph theory is the study of graphs. Graphs are a mathematical representation of a
network used to model pairwise relations between objects. A graph G consists of a set of
nodes V that are representative of objects, with certain pairs of these nodes connected by
edges E. The edges determine the relationship between the nodes. A graph may be either
directed or undirected. An undirected graph means there is no distinction between two
nodes associated with each edge. A directed graph means that its edges may be directed
from one node to another, this relationship is better defined and can represent many ideas
such as node A happened before node B, node A is parent of node B and etc. An example
of a directed graph is shown in Figure 6.2.
We rely on Hyperlink-Induced Topic Search (HITS) in order to determine which vertices
are important to other vertices. We believe that in determining these vertices will allow
inferring the high-level actions taken by the user [113].
HITS was originally designed as a method of filtering results from web page search engines
in order to identify results most relevant to a user query. The output of this algorithm is
two scores for each vertex. The authority value, which estimates the value of the vertex, and
its hub value, which estimates the value by the links to other vertices. We focus on the hub
value in order to understand the high-level actions occurring in the system. A high-level
action is an activity that either the system or user can partake. This includes the opening
of a web browser, a system update or using a specific application. These high-level actions
typically lead to other more specific actions such as sending an email, creating a file or
removing unnecessary memory [113].
PageRank is a link analysis algorithm that computes the ranking of the vertices in the
graph based on the structure of the incoming edges. PageRank was first developed as a
method for computing a ranking for every web page based on the graph of the web. The
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Figure 6.2: A Directed Graph
rank value indicates the importance of a particular page. We employ this concept to our
case study. We believe this ranking will identify key pieces of evidence from our memory
image that we should further examine [113].
6.4 FORMULATE HYPOTHESES
This phase is where the investigator or program interprets the data observed in the pre-
vious phase and formulates hypotheses. In the formal approach, the hypotheses are about
the variables in the inferred history, occurrence of events in the system [10].
Hypotheses that define variables in the model must be formulated in a specific order. For
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example, before hypotheses are made about the contents of a file, hypotheses about the
existence of the file must be formulated and tested [10].
In practice, hypotheses are not always about specific events and specific times. For ex-
ample, based on the observation of a file and the programs that are installed on the system,
a possible hypothesis is that either program X or Y was used to download the file from
the Internet. The investigator formulated this hypothesis based on knowledge that both
programs are capable of downloading files from the Internet, but he has not enumerated all
possible events for each program. Another general hypothesis is that the system is behaving
strangely because it was compromised. The tests for this hypothesis will require additional
hypotheses about specific types of attack events [10].
To be a scientific process, the hypotheses must be capable of being refuted. If a hypothesis
is supported and not refuted, then the relevant data are added to the inferred history. If a
hypothesis is neither supported or refuted, than an assumption can be made that it is true,
but the investigator must be capable of justifying the assumption [10].
If a hypothesis is refuted based on data in the inferred history, then it does not mean that
events and states in the hypothesis did not occur. It means only that they did not occur in
that inferred history, but that inferred history may not be correct.
In theory, hypotheses could be formulated and tested for the occurrence of every known
event at each time and every program on the system could be analyzed to determine which
complex events could occur. In practice, that would be impossible and instead hypothe-
ses and predictions are frequently made based on a combination of system and incident
characteristics [10].
Complex arguments ought to be separated in small ones. The synthesis is the composition
of the partial solutions of the decomposed problem. In the context of forensic investigations
solving a problem should be interpreted as collecting information to prove or disprove the
occurrence of an event in the real world. In other words, in order to be able to draw
conclusive assessment about a case, detectives need to find significant tests to evaluate
the simplest hypotheses. They have to analyze the scene of the crime in order to find
elements that may enable them to estimate their rational belief in hypotheses. In other
words, detectives perform tests aimed at collecting data that are relevant (i.e., provide
information about discrimination between a hypothesis and its negation) in the assessment
of a given hypotheses. We denote mapping between evidence set Ei and hypothesis H as
H → E1, E2, E3, ..., En [113].
Graph traversal is the process of visiting each vertex in a graph. There are multiple
algorithms to aid in graph traversal the shortest path problem. The shortest path problem
deals with the problem of finding a path between two nodes in a graph such that the sum
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of the weights of its constituent edges is minimized [113].
The problem of finding the shortest path between two intersections on a road map (the
graph’s nodes correspond to intersections and the edges correspond to road segments, each
weighted by the length of its road segments). The shortest problem can be defined for graphs
whether undirected or directed. We will now evaluate how each of these elements of graph
theory can contribute to a digital forensic investigation [113].
System characteristics are properties of hardware and software that make some states
events more common for some systems than others. These characteristics allow us to for-
mulate hypotheses based on only the type of software and hardware being investigated.
Frequently, these hypotheses are based on the assumption that the hardware and software
have not been modified to make them operate differently from similar hardware and soft-
ware. For example, based on the type of OS, hypotheses about the file system types can be
formulated [10].
Incident characteristics are the general properties of a crime or incident and are system
independent. These characteristics may allow the investigator to conduct searches for specific
types of evidence using only knowledge about the type of incident. Consider an investigation
where a computer is suspected of being used to formulated that a web browser was used to
download the files. Next, the system characteristics for the web browsers that are installed
are used to predict where evidence may exist. Other examples of incident characteristics are
keywords and hash databases. The one-way hash of files that are associated with a type of
incident can be calculated, saved, and searched for subsequent investigations [10].
6.5 EVALUATE & REEVALUATE HYPOTHESES
Each hypothesis must be tested and that if it identifies evidence that, if it exists, would
support or refute a hypothesis [10].
Based on the test results, new predictions may be made and hypotheses may be re-
vised [10].
If the test supports the hypothesis then the investigator, or automated analysis program,
can choose to define the relevant functions and sets in the inferred history. He may also
choose to conduct more tests and obtain more support before defining the sets and func-
tions [10].
If the test refutes a hypothesis then the data used in the test will dictate what actions
the investigator can perform next. If the test relied on data from the inferred history, then
the refuted hypothesis cannot be used to define sets and functions in that inferred history.
If the data used to refute the hypothesis was defined based on a direct observation, such as
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the state of the video card, then the hypothesis that was tested must be revised or no longer
considered because it conflicts with a direct observation, which the investigator will likely
have a high amount of trust in. If the data used to refute the hypothesis was defined based
on another hypothesis, then the investigator can choose to define a new inferred history [10].
If a hypothesis is refuted based on data that is not in the inferred history, then the relia-
bility and accuracy of the test data should also be considered before refuting the hypothesis.
For example, if a tool is executed on the system could have a rootkit or other malicious soft-
ware that will produce incorrect data. The tool may also be faulty and produce incorrect
data. The tool may also be faulty and produce inaccurate data [10].
6.6 REPORT RESULTS
In order to complete the scientific method, an investigator must communicate the results.
The resulting confidence score from our evaluation will provide as a baseline to present re-
sults. The likelihood ratio formulate represents an economic and intuitive way the hypotheses
about the probabilistic relations existing among the variables of interest [114].
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CHAPTER 7: DISCUSSION
This chapter focuses on applying my model to a hypothetical court case. This hypothet-
ical court case is based on State of Connecticut v. Julie Amero. State of Connecticut v.
Julie Amero exposes the potential impact of digital forensics on an individual’s life. Julie
Amero was a substitute teacher in a seventh grade classroom on October 19th, 2004. She
returned from the hallway when she found two students browsing a hair styling website [18].
Afterwards, the computer browser began continuously opening pop-ups with pornographic
content. She was told not to turn off the computer, and was unaware she could have turned
off the computer monitor. The students were exposed to the pornography [115]. Amero
was convicted on four charges of Risk of Injury to a Child, which carried up to a 40-year
sentence [116]. The primary evidence admitted by the court was the forensic duplicate of the
hard drive on the computer in question. While the forensic investigator did not use industry
standards to duplicate the hard drive, the information was used in the investigation [115].
The evidence showed Internet history of pornographic links that indicated the user delib-
erately went to those sites [117]. The defense evidence showed that anti-virus definitions
were not updated regularly and at the time were at least three months out-of-date. No
antispwayre or client firewall was installed and the school’s content filter expired [115].
The examination of State of Connecticut v. Julie Amero provides insight into how a
general lack of understanding of digital evidence can cause an Innocent defendant to be
wrongfully convicted. Amero was convicted on four charges of Risk of Injury to a Child.
Following delays in sentencing, a new trial was granted when the conviction was overturned
on appeal. Years later, Amero plead guilty to disorderly conduct, her teaching license was
revoked, and she paid a $100 fine [118].
There is a gap in the legal community’s understanding o digital evidence. The failure of
providing sufficient education in digital evidence results in serious miscarriages of Justice
and disruption of the legal system. The innocent wrongly convicted and incarcerated; those
deserving of punishment get away with crimes. Society as whole is better served by increasing
the understanding of digital evidence.
This section will serve as a platform for discussion on the usage of the technique in a
criminal court system. Where the prosecution and defense will both have an opportunity
to use my technique to present to the jury a story of the digital evidence. This section will
shine a light on he current problems of the digital forensic process, how the problems affect
the legal system, and the potential of the technique to resolve these problems.
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7.1 THE CASE STUDY
A substitute teacher returned from the hallway when she found two students browsing
the internet. When the teacher began to restart the lesson the computer screen she was
projecting to the students began to continuously opening pop-ups with pornographic content.
The substitute teacher was arrested on charges of Risk of Injury to a Child. The police called
in a digital forensic examiner. The digital forensic examiner is able to obtain a memory image
from the computer. The substitute teacher hires his own lawyer and digital forensic expert.
In the initial investigation the police will obtain the school’s computer and deliver to their
corresponding digital forensic examiner. The digital forensic examiner will obtain a memory
image from the school’s computer. The digital forensic examiner will apply Sherlock to
obtain a conclusion from this evidence.
In the observation of evidence the digital forensic examiner obtains an image shown in
Figure 7.1. This figure is overwhelmed with noise. They would find it difficult to further
understand what is occurring in this graph. In order to reduce this noise we rely on a method
of differential forensic analysis known as node edge coupling. Differential forensic analysis
compares any pair of digital artifacts and reports the differences between them. Focusing
on the changes allows the examiner to reduce the amount of information that needs to be
examined, while simultaneously focusing on the changes that are thought to be the result of
a subject’s activities. Differential analysis is widely practiced today [87]. The result of the
differential analysis is shown in Figure 7.2.
Node ID Hub Value
firefox.exe 0.8090
paint.exe 0.1909
explorer.exe 0.7.1993e-09
23.209.190.81 0.0
202.209.188.81 0.0
202.209.133.81 0.0
103.41.299.18 0.0
192.168.1.255 0.0
54.201.188.11 0.0
Table 7.1: The hub values of figure 7.2.
For further observation, we rely on our two link analysis algorithms. The HITs to de-
termine pieces of evidence that provides us with overall knowledge of what has occurred in
the system. Table 7.1 shows the results from the HITs algorithm. We are shown a number
of processes that have an integral part to the events in the system. There are three nodes
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with hub values paint.exe, firefox.exe and explorer.exe. The paint.exe process provides ac-
cess to the paint the application. The firefox.exe process represents the Mozilla Firefox web
browser and the explorer.exe process provides a graphical user interface used to interact with
the windows operating system. The next step is to look at the results from the PageRank
algorithm to determine if there are other pieces of evidence to investigate.
The PageRank algorithm leads us to nodes that are an important part of our evidence
graph. Showing us key pieces of evidence to investigate for this case. The results are shown
in Table 7.2.
Node ID PageRank Value
firefox.exe 0.1725
192.168.1.255 0.1076
103.41.299.18 0.1076
202.209.133.81 0.1076
paint.exe 0.1067
202.209.188.81 0.1067
23.209.190.81 0.1067
54.201.188.11 0.1067
explorer.exe 0.0774
Table 7.2: The page rank values of figure 7.2.
As shown in Table 7.2, firefox.exe is an important node. This makes sense from the
evidence provided by the examiner is able to show that a user used Mozilla Firefox to surf
the web. The next node 202.209.133.81 is a network connection made by paint.exe. This is
interesting as the case report does not report on the usage of the paint application. It is also
interesting to note that paint was making multiple network connections. This is abnormal
behavior for this application. Next, the examiner begins to formulate possible hypotheses.
The initial hypothesis is if the computer displayed any pornographic pop ups. This hy-
pothesis is also backed up by a set of evidence E.
Hypothesis H1: Computer displayed pornographic pop ups
Evidence 1 E1: explorer.exe
Evidence 2 E2: firefox.exe
Evidence 3 E3: 23.209.190.81
To note that the DNS resolution for the IP address 23.209.190.81 resolves to a pornographic
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webpage. Next in order to evaluate this hypothesis a Bayesian network. The result of the
evaluation is
Yes No Maybe
0.59 0.05 0.17
Table 7.3: The results of evaluation.
The examiner is presented with a high probability of 59% of the display of popups. This
evidence is presented to the defense and another forensic examiner. That is able to examine
the evidence for themselves. The defense’s digital forensic examiner examines the evidence
for himself and is able to see why the initial examiner concluded H1 from the evidence
E = E1, E2, E3. However, he observes that the paint application was also making connec-
tions to malicious popups. This is abnormal behavior for this application. This examiner
determines a different hypothesis from the evidence graph.
Hypothesis H2: Malware displayed pornographic pop ups
Sub hypothesis H12 : User went to a malicious web page
Evidence 1 E1: explorer.exe
Evidence 2 E2: firefox.exe
Evidence 3 E3: 23.209.190.81
Sub hypothesis H22 : Drive-by-Download of fake paint application
Evidence 2 E1: firefox.exe
Evidence 4 E4: paint.exe
Evidence 5 E5: 21.524.301.97
Evidence 6 E6: 103.41.299.18
Evidence 7 E7: 202.209.18.81
The defense’s examiner further corroborates the witness statement of students web surf-
ing. This allows the examiner to add the fact that a user was surfing the web. The defense
examiner also decides to look for corroboration that the paint.exe is create by malware. He
is able to find and dissect the malware to determine that it creates a paint.exe process to
access the malicious sites shown to the children and add this as a fact in the evaluation. The
results of the defense’s evaluation is shown in Table 7.4.
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Yes No Maybe
0.77 0.0 0.0
Table 7.4: The results of the evaluation.
The results from the separate evaluations are able to be detailed in front of the jury.
The graphical visualizations allow the evidence to exist in a narrative sequence to allow for
storytelling to affect comprehension of the evidence [119]. The jury is able to rely on the
confidence scores help them make assessments about the data. Previously the statistical
reasoning surrounding the evaluations of digital evidence is casual and intuitive, rather than
explicit and rigorous. This methods allows for the continual refinement and reexamination
of hypotheses. Bayes’ Theorem provides a means of updating prior probability estimates
in light of new information. Prior probabilities are contained in the prior odds ratio, while
the diagnostic or probative value of the new information is capture in the likelihood ratio.
The Bayesian approach not only can clarify one’s thinking about evidence. From the usage
of Bayes’ Theorem we can see what information about the evidence is needed, where the
absence of data is replaced by assumptions of witnesses or fact finders, and ultimately, what
impact the evidence should have on the established preexisting beliefs. The decision-maker
has helpful guide posts for updating beliefs, and avoids falling victim to many biases [120].
Without the usage of Bayesian analysis, the digital forensic examiner would be able to
testify about why their hypothesis is true and debate with the defense in front of the court.
However, it would be duty of jury to determine the validity of the facts, and the validity of
the testimony.
Bayes’ theorem approach identifies the accuracy of the tests in practice, combining the
inherent properties of the test with the imperfections of the humans and the tools performing
the tests. That, rather than the theoretical best performance, is what a fact finder needs
to know. The results in terms of the likelihood ratio associated with any particular test
or series of tests makes it difficult to confidently identify the likelihood of an error. The
testimony some analysts give is replete with invisible assumptions and guesswork. These
assumptions and guesses must be returned to the law’s control. If hard data does not exists,
then the expert may not be in a better position to guess than anyone else [120].
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Figure 7.1: The initial graph obtain from the evidence.
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Figure 7.2: The resulting evidence graph after differential analysis.
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CHAPTER 8: CASE STUDY EVALUATIONS
We investigate several cases in order to explore the ability of this techniques to facilitate
digital forensic investigations. Each of these case studies vary in difficulty in terms of the
ability of investigation in order to show both the advantages and disadvantages of this
technique. We focus on a specific type of forensic analysis. Memory forensics is the forensic
analysis of a computer’s memory dump (RAM).
Memory forensics is the branch of digital forensics exploring the contents of a machines
volatile memory (typically DRAM and SRAM). There is a wealth of information in volatile
memory, ranging from modifications to kernel data structures, to network sockets, to encryp-
tion keys which could unlock otherwise useless disks. The analysis of a dump of physical
memory can be a daunting process [121]. Comprehensive and unique information about a
system’s state can be extracted from an image of its main memory. In addition to the current
state, it is possible to derive alot of information about a system’s past from the memory
dump. Among other things there is time stamped information about processes, threads and
network activity [122].
In order to analyze the contents of memory, first and foremost, one needs a source of
memory dumps. Obviously, we had quite a number of options available to use to capture
memory. To test and run our techniques, we created a variety of use case scenarios created
by myself as well as digital forensic challenges created by the digital forensics communities.
We chose the software VirtualBox [123] to virtualize our system and collect memory dumps.
Like most virtualization setups ti allows for a variety of useful functionalities, including
snapshots, memory y capture and more. VirtualBox was selected over a handful of other
virtualization options due to it compatibility, ease of memory capture and ease of use.
Volatility is an advanced memory forensic framework which analyzes RAM dumps from
32- and 64-bit windows, linux, mac and android systems. Volatility’s modular design design
allows it to easily support new operating systems and architectures. The extraction tech-
niques are performed completely independent of the system being investigated but offers
visibility into the runtime state of the system [67]. This technique focuses on exploring the
relationships of the data structures shown in memory.
8.1 CASE STUDY: DROPBOX PROBLEMS
We demonstrate the potential of this analysis with a case study. In our case study, a
company has requested forensic analysis on an employees computer. One of its employees
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found a PDF file on the company shared Dropbox account. Upon opening the file the
employee did not seem to notice anything, however, the IT department has verified that the
employee’s credentials have been stolen.
We first define the nodes and links of our graph. We are given a memory image from
the employees Windows 7 virtual machine. Memory images contain a great deal of volatile
evidence. We determine our nodes to be both processes and network connections. The links
are exemplified by processes that fork other processes or make network connections. This
forms a directed graph as a parent process initializes a child process or network connections.
The first step involved in the scientific method is the observation of the evidence. The
analyst must observe the evidence. In order to observe our evidence, in this case, we build
our graph. The graph-based representation of our evidence is shown in Figure A.1.
We are inundated with evidence, however, not all of the evidence is important to our
case. We rely on differential analysis to remove the noise from Figure A.1. We are able to
accomplish this by create a graph based on a clean Window 7 machine. Then, we perform
node-edge coupling in order to remove the nodes and edges from the graph that are routine
functions in Windows 7 machines, which leaves the user related activities that are important
to the case. We are presented with a new evidence graph shown in Figure A.2.
Next, we rely on our two previous link analysis algorithms to make more observations.
We use HITs to determine pieces of evidence that provide us with overall knowledge of
what has occurred in the system. Table A.1 shows our results from the HITS algorithm.
We are shown a number of processes that have integral parts of the routine operating of a
Windows 7 operating system. The services.exe correlates to the Services Control Manager,
which is responsible for running, ending, and interacting with the system services. The
svchost.exe is a system process that hosts multiple Windows services and is essential in the
implementation of shared service processes. The wininit.exe is the Windows Initialize is a
core system process that aids in the startup of the operating system. The System is a system
process that is responsible for the system memory and compressed memory. The lsass.exe
generates a users access token, which is used to launch the initial shell. The VboxService.exe
is required for the guest services of VirtualBox to work properly. The WmiPrvSE.exe is a
component that provides management information and control in an enterprise environment.
These processes are established hub operating within the system, they all are important in
starting up other processes and connections. We are also able to identify three other hubs
firefox.exe, explorer.exe, and AcroRd32.exe. The explorer.exe process provides a graphical
interface you use to interact with most of Windows. From here we infer that the user relied
on the graphical user interface in order to interact with the computer. The firefox.exe process
represents that the Mozilla Firefox web browser available for surfing the web. We are able
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to infer that there was an activity involving web surfing activity. Lastly, the AcroRd32.exe
process that runs the Adobe Reader, typically to use to view PDF files. We infer that the
user opens a PDF file. This is in line with information we received about the case. The next
step is we rely on the PageRank algorithm to determine if there are other pieces of evidence
we should investigate. TableA.2 shows our results from the PageRank algorithm.
As shown in Table A.2, we receive a ranking of pieces of evidence. Some pieces were all
also identified as a hub, explorer.exe, and firefox.exe. We then are shown another address
192.168.1.115. This address is unknown to us and warrants further investigation. When
we look at the graph and see that the AcroRd32.exe makes the connection to the unknown
address. This is interesting as this is not within the norm for the AcroRd32.exe process.
Now that we have made some observation about the evidence. Next, we begin to formulate
possible hypotheses.
In order to formulate valid hypotheses, we rely on graph traversal. Graph traversal is the
process of visiting each vertex in a graph. In order for a hypothesis to be valid, we rely on
a mapping between a set of evidence E, and hypothesis H as H → E1, E2, E3, ..., En. From
our case study, we identified an unknown address. This makes us suspicious that the user
had a malicious PDF file that made a network connection to another machine. The goal
would be then to find a path from explorer.exe to 192.168.1.115. The corresponding path is
explorer.exe - AcroRd32.exe - 192.168.1.115. From our prior knowledge of the case, we know
that the employee found the PDF on a company shared Dropbox folder. We can see that
the employee accesses firefox.exe and we can assume downloaded the PDF. After opening
the file with Adobe Reader, we determine a malicious course of action through the direct
access to a network connection by Adobe Reader. We have successfully used elements of
graph theory to provide a logical view of events from the evidence as well as determine a
valid hypothesis. The next step is to evaluate our hypothesis.
Stemming from our case study hypothesis H is the root node of the Bayesian network.
The root node does not have a parent node, its prior probabilities are unconditional. To
begin with, the probabilities of H are evenly distributed among its three states, i.e., P (H)
(0.333, 0.333, 0.333).
Hypothesis H: Employee downloaded a PDF from Dropbox, the PDF made an unwarranted
network connection and ran a keylogger.
Evidence 1 E1: explorer.exe
Evidence 2 E2: firefox.exe
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Evidence 3 E3: Dropbox
Evidence 4 E4: AcroRd32.exe
Evidence 5 E5: 192.168.1.115
Evidence 6 E6: notepad.exe
H1: Downloaded PDF from Dropbox: E1 → E2 → E3
H2: PDF made unwarranted network connection: E1 → E4 → E5
H3: PDF ran keylogger: E1 → E4 → E6
Items of digital evidence correspond to past digital events (or posterior evidence) that
can be used to support or refute the hypothesis H. One of the main challenges in ap-
plying a Bayesian network to evaluate evidence is assigning probability values of posterior
evidence. This is because the assignments are usually based on subjective personal beliefs.
Although the personal beliefs of a digital forensic analyst are assumed to arise from pro-
fessional knowledge and experience, there are no means to determine whether they truly
represent the accepted views of the digital forensic discipline, let alone whether the proba-
bility values assigned to posterior evidence are, in fact accurate.
To enhance the reliability and accuracy of the probability assignments for posterior evi-
dence, we attempted to use objective probability assignments obtained through the proba-
bility mass function. The probability mass function is a function that gives the probability
of a discrete random variable is exactly equal to some value. In the evidentiary context,
a higher probability is assigned to pieces of evidence which is better supported by other
pieces of evidence. We are able to determine the probability mass function with the degree
distribution of our evidence graph in Figure A.2. Table A.3 and Table A.4 shown both the
degree distribution and the results of the probabilistic mass function from the evidence chain
of our hypothesis.
In forensic cases, it is necessary to account for 0 or 1 facts of the case. This happens when
an entire file is found or the investigating the effects of malware on the system. This, as
shown above, leads to changes in our results of yes and no and only slightly affects the maybe
depending on the importance of the evidence. Now, that we have results, the next to report
them. In this case, we can apply 1 to the fact of the keylogger as after further evaluation
of the evidence the malware for the keylogger was found. The results of the evaluation are
shown in Table A.5.
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8.2 CASE STUDY: BANKING TROUBLES
In this case study, from Honeynet Project: Banking Troubles [124]. A company X has
contacted an digital examiner to perform forensics work on a recent incident that occurred.
One of their employees had received an email from a fellow co-worker that pointed to a PDF
file. Upon opening, the employee did not seem to notice anything, however, recently they
have had unusual activity in their bank account. Company X was able to obtain a memory
image of the employee’s virtual machine upon suspected infection. Company X wishes you
to analyze the virtual memory and report on any suspected activities found.
The EPROCESS structure is the kernel’s representation of a process object. This contains
information about both the parent process of each process object. The relationship between
a parent process and child process, is that the parent process forks a newly created process
known as the child process. The operating system kernel identifies each process by its
process identifier. We first define the vertices and edges of our graph. We are given a
memory image from a Windows XP SP2 x86 as our sole source of evidence. Memory images
contain a great deal of volatile evidence. We determine our vertices to be both processes and
network connections. The edges are exemplified by processes that fork other processes or
make network connections. This forms a directed graph as a parent process initializes a child
process or network connection. We begin by building the a graph focused on the relationships
between the parent process and child process. The pictorial representation of the process
structure in this memory image provides us with information shown in Figure B.1. We
are presented with two subgraphs. Our initial subgraph appears to show routine computer
activity as shown in Figure B.3. In Figure B.2 we see a variety of nodes that pertain to our
case. To further observe the evidence we rely on HITs in order to determine which vertices
are important to other nodes. The results of running this link analysis algorithm will allow
inferring the actions taken.
Because we decided that one subgraph was of the most importance to us based on the
nodes in that graph we run HITs on that subgraph. explorer.exe has the highest hub values.
explorer.exe is the user shell, which is represented as the the Windows taskbar, desktop,
and other user interface features. This indicates that a user of this system relied on the
graphical user interface. firefox.exe has the second highest hub value. This indicates that
the user opened the web browser known as Mozilla Firefox indicating the user intended to
access the internet. This information aligns with the case study. As the employee stated
they received an email, we can see they relied on web browser to access their email this is
shown in Table B.1.
Next, we look at the results of PageRank. The highest ranking value shown in Table B.2
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is AcroRd32.exe. AcroRd32.exe is the executable file that runs the Adobe Reader, a tool
to view, print and share files in portable document format (PDF). This also aligns with the
information given about the case as the co-worked downloaded a PDF.
Now, that we have observed the evidence, I begin to formulate a hypothesis about what
has occurred. It appears that the employee downloaded a PDF base.
Hypothesis H: X accessed firefox.exe and downloaded a PDF which made a connection
to 212.150.164.20
E1: explorer
E2: firefox.exe
E3: AcroRd32.exe
E4: 212.150.164.20
H1: X access Firefox: E1 → E2 H2: PDF is downloaded: E2 → E3 H3: PDF connects to
212.150.164.20: E3 → E4
We determine the prior probability for each piece of evidence based on the results of the
probability mass function with results shown in Table B.3 and Table B.4. The results of the
evaluation is shown in Table B.5.
In order to highlight the potential of this method, we should the reevaluation of the
evidence after new evidence obtained. As shown in Figure B.4. Evidence was found that
connected the ip address to the user’s bank server. This update extends to changes in the
prior probability of each piece of evidence shown in Table B.6 and Table B.7. The updated
results are shown in Table B.8.
8.3 CASE STUDY: W32.CRIDEX
W32.Cridex is a worm, a type of malware that replicates and circulates without human
intervention. W32.Cridex can replicate and spread not only inside of your computer, but
also to other computers connected to your network. The W32.Cridex is extremely dangerous
because of its ability to spread quickly [125].
W32.Cridex infects your computer, it tries to create a copy of itself as a Windows exe-
cutable file. After infecting your computer, W32.Cridex will attempt to use your network to
connect with its source computer. The primary goal is to update itself and download other
malware programs and files [125].
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W.32 Cridex also attempts to infect the Windows Registry of your computer. The purpose
is to remain undetectable, protect other malicious programs its downloads, start up when
the computer boots, and ultimately take full control over your computer [125].
We review the implementation of this method on W32.Cridex. The analyst must observe
the evidence. The graph-based representation of our evidence is shown in Figure C.1. We
are presented with two graphs show in Figure C.2 and Figure C.3. We focus on Figure C.2.
Next, we rely on our two previous link analysis algorithms to make more observations. We
use HITs to determine pieces of evidence that provide us with overall knowledge of what has
occurred in the system. Table C.1 shows our results from the HITS algorithm. Table C.2
shows the results from the PageRank algorithm.
We see that reader sl is a child process of explorer.exe. The parent process of explorer.exe
is 1463. reader sl.exe is process associated with Adobe Speed Launcher however, the launch
chain is interesting. We also see that explorer.exe is a parent node for an active connec-
tion to a remote IP address 41.165.5.140. This IP address is traced back to a corporation
Neotel Operations in Johannesburg, South Africa. It is interesting to note that 1484 made
a connection to the IP address 125.19.103.198. This IP address is traced back to Bharti
Tele-Ventures Limited in New Delhi, India.
We implement my methodology in order to obtain a better understanding of this malware.
Hypothesis H: Malware makes unwarranted network connections.
Evidence 1 E1: 1464
Evidence 2 E2: explorer.exe
Evidence 3 E3: 125.19.103.198
Evidence 4 E4: 41.168.5.140
H1: E1 → E3
H2: E1 → E2 → E3
The we shown the evaluation results in Table C.3, Table C.4 and Table C.5. In this case,
the result is not truly satisfying to us as we have a very high statistical likelihood for either
of our categories. This is due to the lack of evidence provided in the graph. With limited
supporting evidence for the root hypothesis, weakens the results of the evaluation. This
problem can be solved by looking at evidence from varied mediums. At the moment we only
look at memory, however, there is more information to be found in network traffic, files,
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documents, and the file system.
8.4 CASE STUDY: WEBSITE PROBLEMS
A company’s web server has been breached through their website. A team arrived just in
time to take a forensic image of the running system and its memory for further analysis [126].
In this case, we find that the cmdscan plugin searches the memory of csrss.exe on XP/Vista
and conhost.exe on Windows 7 for commands that attacker entered through a console
(cmd.exe). This is one of the most powerful commands you can use to gain visibility into an
attackers actions on a victim system, whether they opened cmd.exe through an RDP session
or proxied input/output to a command shell from a networked backdoor [67].
This plugin finds structures known as COMMAND HISTORY by looking for a known
constant value (MaxHistory) and applying sanity checks. The structures used by this plugin
are not public, thus they’re not available in WinDBG or any other forensic framework. They
were reverse engineered by Michael Ligh from the conhost.exe and winsrv.dll binaries [67].
In addition to the commands entered into a shell, this plugin shows:
• The name of the console host process (csrss.exe or conhost.exe)
• The name of the application using the console (whatever process is using cmd.exe)
• The location of the command history buffers, including current buffer count, last added
command, and displayed command
• The application process handle
Due to the scanning technique this plugin uses, it has the capability to find commands
from both active and closed consoles. Current memory forensics tools concentrate mainly
on system-related information like processes and sockets. The command history operating
system a prime source of evidence in many intrusions and other computer crimes, revealing
important details about an offender’s activities on the subject system [127].
The Microsoft Windows command prompt (cmd.exe) is often used by perpetrators of com-
puter crime, and being able to reconstruct what instructions were executed on the command
line can be important in a digital investigation. Computer intruders go so far as to place
their own copy of the command prompt executable on a compromised system to facilitate
their unauthorized activities. The command history maintained by the Windows command
prompt can contain valuable information such as what programs were executed with asso-
ciated arguments, files and folders that were accessed, and unique information such as IP
addresses, domain names and network shares [128].
59
The first step involved in the scientific method is the observation of the evidence. The
analyst must observe the evidence. In order to observe our evidence, in this case, we build
our graph. The graph-based representation of our evidence is shown in Figure D.1. A table
to reference the commands found is shown in Table D.1.
We use HITs to determine pieces of evidence that provide us with overall knowledge of
what has occurred in the system. Table D.2 shows the results from the HITS algorithm.
There are a notable pieces of evidence from these results. We see that explorer.exe is a hub,
as well as services.exe, 192.168.56.1, mysqld.exe, and xampp-control.e. This information
lets us know that there is a web site hosted on this machine. services.exe is associated
with Services Control Manager which is responsible for running, ending, and interacting
with system services. mysqld.exe is associated with MySQL Server. xampp-control.e is
associated with XAMPP an open source web server.
The results of the PageRank algorithm is found Table D.3. From these results we see
other important pieces of evidence. httpd.exe is associated with Apache HTTP Server and
cmd.exe is associated with the Windows N/T command line interpreter. We take a further
look at the command performed using cmd.exe in Table D.1. ipconfig displays all current
TCP/IP network configuration values. net user /add adds a user to certain group and it
appears to add a user to the remote desktop users group.
Stemming from our case study hypothesis H is the root node of the Bayesian network.
Hypothesis H: Company’s website was hacked and gained access to the company’s machine.
Evidence 1 E1: explorer.exe
Evidence 2 E2: xampp-control.e
Evidence 3 E3: mysqld.exe
Evidence 4 E4: httpd.exe
Evidence 5 E5: FileZillaServer
Evidence 6 E7: 472
Evidence 7 E8: csrss.exe
Evidence 8 E9: cmd#
H1: Company is up Website: E1 → E5
H2: Hacker tries to gain access: E6 → E8
The evaluation and results are shown in Table D.4, Table D.5, and Table D.6. In forensic
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cases, it is necessary to account for 0 or 1 facts of the case. This happens when an entire file
is found or the investigating the effects of malware on the system. This, as shown above,
leads to changes in our results of yes and no and only slightly affects the maybe depending
on the importance of the evidence. Now, that we have results, the next to report them.
We rely on the implementation of a likelihood ratio in order to estimate the credibility
of the analysis performed by the examiner and the strength of the evidence. The likelihood
ratio is a way of comparing probabilities conditioned a hypothesis. While the possibility of
using likelihood ratios are still being weighed in the legal system we believe it is a great tool
to contribute the scientific method during a digital forensic investigation. It would bring a
careful and balanced approach to expert evidence.
We rely on the implementation of a likelihood ratio in order to estimate the credibility
of the analysis performed by the examiner and the strength of the evidence. The likelihood
ratio is a way of comparing probabilities conditioned a hypothesis. While the possibility of
using likelihood ratios are still being weighed in the legal system we believe it is a great tool
to contribute the scientific method during a digital forensic investigation. It would bring a
careful and balanced approach to expert evidence.
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CHAPTER 9: CONCLUSION & FUTURE WORK
This dissertation explores the need to improve the field of the digital forensics and proposes
that the computer science and digital forensics community begin to work in tandem to reach
this goal. I presented multiple methods in order to accomplish this goal.
The Digital Forensic Education Initiative offers a standardized a multidisciplinary curricu-
lum model for digital forensics education. This project transformed the multidisciplinary
undergraduate education at the University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign by institution-
alizing this program and the collaboration upon which it is built. In accordance with the
multidisciplinary nature of the field of digital forensics, the curriculum development team
included domain experts in computer security, computer networks, law, civil and criminal
justice, fraud investigation, and psychology. The modular approach to curriculum develop-
ment is organized by a three-course digital forensics education sequence and the modules are
combined to form a coherent narrative, thus exposing students to multiple perspectives on
digital forensics. The curriculum package provides a strong theoretical foundation for the
techniques learned by the students as well as an array of studies in fields related to digital
forensics. Hopefully this paper will initiate a conversation with the international community,
note that standards need to continue to be developed for digital forensics curriculum, and rec-
ognize the multidisciplinary need for this field of study. This project, curriculum, and course
outline are available on the website http://publish.illinois.edu/digital-forensics/
and a content package containing all of these materials will be posted there in the near
future.
I examined the methods used during the analysis phase of the digital forensic process.
Evidence reasoning models are an important part of the forensic process. Unlike traditional
forensic sciences, digital forensics deals almost exclusively with objects of non-deterministic
nature; there is great difficulty in analyzing and scrutinizing digital evidence. Fundamen-
tal flaws hinder current evidence analysis models in their ability to assess accurately the
likelihood of crime occurrence. Furthermore, conclusions based on probabilities complicate
explanations in the courtroom. These flaws must be identified and understood to avoid the
possibility of injudicious assumptions resulting from the forensic process.
Differential analysis of digital evidence becomes difficult when the scope of the investiga-
tion is widened; unintentional noise in the form of benign modifications may lead to dubious
conclusions about system integrity. Furthermore, recent obfuscation techniques have suc-
cessfully averted detection by traditional methods. Event reconstruction models are limited
in their ability to provide investigators with clear attack scenarios, because they rely on the
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exhaustive identification of possible machine states; there is yet to be a resource providing
such information. Probabilistic reasoning models rely on prior probabilities known to the
investigator, which have so far mainly been determined from surveying others in the field.
Besides the obvious expenditure of time and effort in conducting such surveys, it is reckless
to underestimate the potential for entropy and reason that small samples of observed prob-
abilities hold true for all investigations. It can be concluded that each of these techniques is
only applicable to a small niche of forensic scenarios.
The increasing rate of software development places a burden on forensic examiners to
keep up with the latest software packages, both commercial and free. Each of the models
discussed in this paper lacks a comprehensive database of information to conduct analysis
with the highest accuracy. We highlight the need for a community-driven, updated catalog
of file hashes, machine states, and probability metrics for use in forensic analysis. The
changing nature of technology and software necessitates that researchers and law enforcement
collaborate to ensure the digital forensic process is as reliable as possible.
I realized the potential of integrating computer science research in the field of digital
forensics. I rely on graph theory to serve as the basis for further analysis of data generated
from digital forensics tools. In particular, the graphical representation of evidence allows
an investigator to not only visualize but perform data analysis on evidence. This analysis
enables forensic investigators to locate information of interest efficiently.
Initial work with graph theory has identified several areas for future research. The first
area is an exploration of relationships among the evidence. This research has begun in
previous works however, it still needs to be continued alongside the exploration of time-
dependent graphs. Digital evidence has multiple relationships that are both dependent on
time and not. Exploring this area can lead to further insight and greater knowledge. The
second area of exploration is the potential to develop algorithms based on graph theory. In
digital forensics, outlier detection is not enough to detect everyday user actions. However,
through the exploration of link analysis, this might be possible to determine potentially
unique events. This area of exploration will require a lot of well-documented datasets open
to the public. The third area of exploration is the automation of this tool. The automation
of determining relationships among artifacts as well as the interpretation of them. This work
is also already in progress by many previous works.
I explored the potential benefits of using graph representation in digital forensics. It is
possible to get a high-level view of the system without requiring extensive knowledge of the
operating system and its applications. In this paper, we successfully showed the potential of
using graph representation in the analysis. We show this by exploring a case studies.In the
future, we believe that this work can be greatly improved by exploring more relationships.
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We plan to further these efforts by building a prototype and implementing more forms of
analysis.
I presented a structured method for implementing and maintaining the scientific method,
as well as, determining a likelihood of a hypothesis. The assignment of likelihoods provides
us with great a benefit. We can quantify the likelihood of a hypothesis in relation to digital
evidence, limiting examiner bias as well as being better able to test everything hypothesis.
However, we are still hindered by the common digital forensic practice problems, such as
the amount of data, varying data types and how the legal system view these computational
techniques. Yet, this method is necessary to begin a formalization.
Future work involves researching existing case law in order to assist in revamping curricu-
lum to improve digital evidence literacy among law students. It is excepted that a thorough
analysis of cases where digital evidence has been inappropriately handled will further refine
recommendations for curriculum content made above. Also, insights of thorough examina-
tion of case law will be disseminated broadly to the digital forensics community.
I also plan to research of evidence-based on techniques. In the case study scenarios, we
define evidence as memory artifacts and we limit our memory artifacts to a small set. This
worked for our case, however, may not work in all scenarios. Second, the development of
a Bayesian network for each hypothesis would be time-consuming to perform manually the
development of an automated system would ease this process greatly. Lastly, the ability
to identify all the possible hypotheses is crucial, however, they may not be evident. The
development of methods to examine evidence and identify key areas of interest will aid
examiners in the investigative process.
Overall this work shows the connection between computer science and digital forensics.
It is of uptmost importance to begin to further research in the field of digital forensics with
the support of the computer science community. Digital forensics is in need of objective
methodologies to obtain conclusions from evidence. We presented a method to regulate the
analysis process. We believe that after an implementation of this method we can use various
computational techniques and apply them to digital forensic analysis in order to determine
standards for current cases. We also plan to analyze already other potential analysis models
in order to compare their advantages and disadvantages.
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APPENDIX A: CASE STUDY: DROPBOX PROBLEMS
Node ID Hub Value
firefox.exe 0.9999
AcroRd32.exe 7.9396e-09
explorer.exe 7.9396e-09
WmiPrvSE.exe 1.1282e-22
notepad.exe 0.0
54.201.155.11 0.0
192.168.1.115 0.0
23.209.190.51 0.0
Dropbox 0.0
Table A.1: The hub value results from the hyperlinked-induced topic search from Figure A.2
Node ID PageRank Value
firefox.exe 0.1235
AcroRd32.exe 0.1235
notepad.exe 0.1216
192.168.1.115 0.1216
Dropbox 0.1041
23.209.190.51 0.1014
54.201.155.11 0.1014
WmiPrvSE.exe 0.0691
Table A.2: The PageRank value results from Figure A.2
Degree Degree Probability
1 0.6666
3 0.2222
4 0.1111
Table A.3: The results of the probability mass function for Figure A.2.
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Node Prior Probability Value
explorer.exe 0.2222
firefox.exe 0.1111
Dropbox 0.6666
AcroRd32.exe 0.2222
notepad.exe 0.6666
192.168.1.115 0.6666
Table A.4: The prior probability for each piece of evidence.
Yes No Uncertain
0.7722 0.33 0.5578
Table A.5: The results from the evaluation.
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Figure A.1: A graph-based representation of the evidence.
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Figure A.2: A graph-based representation of the evidence after differential analysis.
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APPENDIX B: CASE STUDY: BANKING TROUBLES
Node ID Hub Value
firefox.exe 0.9999
explorer.exe 1.0314e-08
AcrodRd32.exe 6.8715-e26
1660 6.8715e-26
VMwareUser.exe 0.0
VMwareTray.exe 0.0
212.159.164.203 0.0
127.0.0.1 0.0
66.249.91.103 0.0
212.150.164.203 0.0
66.249.90.104 0.0
Table B.1: The hub value results from the hyperlinked-induced topic search from Figure B.2.
Node ID PageRank
212.159.164.203 0.1311
explorer.exe 0.1171
firefox.exe 0.0965
VMwareUser.exe 0.0965
VMwareTray.exe 0.0965
AcroRd32.exe 0.0797
66.249.91.103 0.0797
127.0.0.1 0.0797
212.150.164.203 0.0797
1660 0.0633
Table B.2: The PageRank values for Figure B.2.
Degree Degree Probability
1 0.7272
2 0.0909
4 0.0909
6 0.0909
Table B.3: The results of the probability mass function for Figure B.2.
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Figure B.1: A graph-based representation of the evidence.
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Figure B.2: A subgraph of Figure B.1.
Node Prior Probability Value
explorer.exe 0.0909
firefox.exe 0.0909
AcroRd32.exe 0.0909
212.150.164.203 0.7272
Table B.4: The prior probability for each piece of evidence.
Yes No Uncertain
0.3305 0.4890 0.8404
Table B.5: The results from the evaluation.
Degree Degree Probability
1 0.7692
2 0.0769
3 0.0769
4 0.0769
6 0.0769
Table B.6: The updated results of the probability mass function.
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Figure B.3: A subgraph of Figure B.1.
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Figure B.4: An updated subgraph of Figure B.2.
Node ID Prior Probability Value
explorer.exe 0.0769
firefox.exe 0.0769
AcrodRd32.exe 0.0769
212.150.164.203 0.7692
Bank Server 0.7692
Table B.7: The prior probability of each piece of evidence.
Yes No Uncertain
0.6366 0.4662 0.5571
Table B.8: The updated results from the evaluation.
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APPENDIX C: CASE STUDY: W32.CRIDEX
Figure C.1: A graph-based representation of the evidence.
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Figure C.2: A subgraph of Figure C.1.
Node ID Hub Value
explorer.exe 0.9999
1464 2.5811e-09
41.168.5.140 0.0
reader sl.exe 0.0
125.19.103.198 0.0
Table C.1: The hub value results from the hyperlinked-induced topic search from Figure C.2.
Node ID PageRank Value
explorer.exe 0.2492
125.19.103.198 0.2053
41.168.5.140 0.2053
reader sl.exe 0.2053
1464 0.1347
Table C.2: The results from the pagerank algorithm from Figure C.2.
Degree Degree Probability
1 0.8
4 0.2
Table C.3: The results of the probability mass function for Figure C.2.
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Figure C.3: A subgraph of Figure C.1.
Node Prior Probability Value
explorer.exe 0.2
reader sl.exe 0.8
41.168.5.140 0.8
125.19.103.198 0.8
1464 0.8
Table C.4: The prior probability for each piece of evidence.
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Yes No Uncertain
0.027 0.0004 0.0004
Table C.5: The results from the evaluation.
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APPENDIX D: CASE STUDY: WEBSITE PROBLEMS
CMD ID Command
cmd1 ipconfig
cmd2 cls
cmd3 net user user1 user1 /add
cmd4 net user user1 user1 root@psut /add
cmd5 net user user1 Root@psut /add
cmd6 net /?
cmd7 net localgroup /?
cmd8 net localgroup “Remote Desktop Users” user1 /add
cmd9 netsh /?
cmd10 netsh firewall /?
cmd11 netsh firewall set service type = remotedesktop /?
cmd12 netsh firewall set service = remotedesktop enable
cmd13 netsh firewall set service type=remotedesktop mode=enable
cmd14 netsh firewall set service type=remotedesktop mode=enable scope=subnet
cmd15 netsh fireall set service type=remotedesktop mode=enable scope=subnet
cmd16 et.exe
Table D.1: The list of commands with their node identification labels shown in the Fig-
ures D.1.
86
Node ID Hub Value Node ID Hub Value
explorer.exe 0.9999 services.exe 4.3789e-09
192.168.56.1 1.0253e-09 myslqd.exe 9.8977e-10
xampp-control.e 2.2989e-10 msdtc.exe 2.6843e-20
wininit.exe 2.6843e-20 472 2.6843e-20
516 2.6843e-20 svchost.exe 3.1498e-25
System 3.1498e-25 FTKImager.exe 3.1498e-25
676 3.1498e-25 0 0.0
taskeng.exe 0.0 lsm.exe 0.0
lsass.exe 0.0 SLsvc.exe 0.0
cmd.exe 0.0 httpd.exe 0.0
smsss.exe 0.0 csrss.exe 0.0
winlogon.exe 0.0 VBoxService.exe 0.0
spoolsv.exe 0.0 TrustedInstalle 0.0
FileZillaServer 0.0 cmd1 0.0
cmd2 0.0 cmd3 0.0
cmd4 0.0 cmd5 0.0
cmd6 0.0 cmd7 0.0
cmd8 0.0 cmd9 0.0
cmd10 0.0 cmd11 0.0
cmd12 0.0 cmd13 0.0
cmd14 0.0 cmd15 0.0
cmd16 0.0 0.0.0.0:0 0.0
:::0 0.0 *:* 0.0
Table D.2: The hub value results from the hyperlinked-induced topic search from Figure D.1.
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Figure D.1: A graph-based representation of the evidence.
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Node ID PageRank Value Node ID PageRank Value
explorer.exe 0.05468 0.0.0.0:0 0.0460
httpd.exe 0.0419 winlogon.exe 0.0378
xampp-control.e 0.0308 cmd.exe 0.0308
FTKImager.exe 0.307 csrss.exe 0.0284
System 0.0284 192.168.56.1 0.0274
smss.exe 0.0274 :::0 0.02653
mysqld.exe 0.0241 FileZillaServer 0.0241
*:* 0.0230 taskeng.exe 0.0230
wininit.exe 0.0219 lsass.exe 0.0215
services.exe 0.0215 lsm.exe 0.0215
spoolsv.exe 0.0179 msdtc.exe 0.0179
svchost.exe 0.0179 TrustedInstalle 0.0179
SLsvc.exe 0.0179 VBoxService.exe 0.0219
cmd1 0.0169 cmd2 0.0169
cmd3 0.0169 cmd4 0.0169
cmd5 0.0169 cmd6 0.0169
cmd7 0.0169 cmd8 0.0169
cmd9 0.0169 cmd10 0.0169
cmd11 0.0169 cmd12 0.0169
cmd13 0.0169 cmd14 0.0169
cmd15 0.0169 cmd16 0.0169
472 0.0153 516 0.0153
0 0.0153 676 0.0153
Table D.3: The results from the pagerank algorithm from Figure D.1.
Degree Degree Probability
1 0.7111
2 0.0666
3 0.0888
4 0.0666
5 0.0222
8 0.0222
17 0.0222
Table D.4: The results of the probability mass function for Figure D.1.
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Node Prior Probability Value
explorer.exe 0.0666
xampp-control.e 0.0666
mysqld.exe 0.0666
httpd.exe 0.0888
FileZillaServer 0.7111
472 0.0666
csrss.exe 0.0222
cmd# 0.7111
Table D.5: The prior probability for each piece of evidence.
Yes No Uncertain
7.5844e-10 0.0 0.3296
Table D.6: The results from the evaluation.
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